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NEGOTIATION STRATEGY, PROCESS, AND BEHAVIOR:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
MID-LEVEL MARKETING EXECUTIVES IN U.S. AND THAILAND

by

Somnuk Chandarapatin

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
School of Business and Entrepreneurship
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for the degree of

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by
Somnuk Chandarapratin

We hereby certify that this Dissertation submitted by
Somnuk Chandarapratin conforms to acceptable standards,
and as such is fully adequate in scope and quality.
It is therefore approved as the fulfillment of the
Dissertation requirement for the degree of
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CERTIFICATION STATEMENT

I hereby certify that this paper constitutes my own product, that where the language of others is set forth, quotation marks so indicate, and that appropriate credit is given where I have used the language, ideas, expressions or writings of another.

Signed S. Chandarapatin
Somnuk Chandarapatin

ABSTRACT

NEGOTIATION STRATEGY, PROCESS, AND BEHAVIOR: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MID-LEVEL MARKETING EXECUTIVES IN U.S. AND THAILAND

by

Somnuk Chandarapratin

This research investigated strategy, process, and behavior of buyer-seller negotiations in the global audio-video equipment industry. A comparative analysis of mid-level marketing managers in the US and Thailand is presented.

Negotiation simulations were conducted using 50 American and 50 Thai marketing managers. Data collection instruments included pre- and post-negotiation questionnaires, pay-off matrices, and videotape. Analytical methods included content analysis for evaluating conversational content and observational methods for analyzing conversational form. Hypotheses were tested using Pearson correlation analysis, Student's T-test, and Mann-Whitney U Test.

The results indicated that: 1) There was a highly significant inverse relationship between seller's profits and buyer's problem-solving approach for the American group. There was no significant relationship between seller's profits and buyer's problem-solving approach for the Thai group; 2) There were no significant relationships between buyer's satisfaction and seller's problem-solving approach, seller's problem-solving approach and buyer's problem-solving approach, seller's profits and seller's problem-solving approach, and buyer's satisfaction and seller's attractiveness for both groups; 3) There were no significant differences in seller's attractiveness, seller's problem-solving approach, buyer's satisfaction, buyer's problem-solving approach, and conversational content based on the frequency of self-disclosure occurred between the two groups. There were significant differences in buyer's profits, seller's profits, joint profits, conversational

content based on the frequency of promise, and question occurred, conversational form based on the frequency of the word "no", conversational overlap, and facial gazing occurred between the two groups;

4) There were no significant differences in the individual profit achieved between buyer and seller for the American marketing managers. There were significant differences in the individual profit achieved between buyer and seller for the Thai marketing managers.

Management implications of this research are that efforts should be put into appropriate selecting and training marketing executives in this industry. The focus should be on abilities to adapt/adjust and manage the cross-cultural negotiation processes and settings efficiently and effectively. Directions for future research included the emphasis on cross-cultural negotiations in different settings.

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated with respect, gratituity and love to the author's late mother, Jifa Chandarapratin. The very thought of her served as a source of inspiration, hope, encouragement and moral support for the author to complete this research study.

She will remain in the author's heart, mind and soul forever.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Problem

Importance of Global Economy, International Business, and Negotiations

One of the most dramatic and significant events of recent years has been the internationalization of the world economy and unprecedented global economic activity. A major force underlying this event has been the rapid, sustained growth of international business. International business has become massive in scale and has come to exercise a major influence over political, economic, and social development throughout the world (Robock & Simmond, 1989).

This growth in business activity across national boundaries has brought with it many changes. The important changes are the dramatic and increasing challenges in the globalization of business, especially:

1. The growing interdependence in the world economic arena such as the strategic thrust toward economic cooperation as well as the growing importance of global strategic alliances.

2. Global sourcing and global distribution networks in the global economy.

These two factors lead to the formation of collaborative agreements between entities from different countries/cultures. A major prerequisite to the formation of such agreements is successful face-to-face international business/marketing negotiations.

Asia's Pacific Rim and Southeast Asia: Portfolio of Opportunity

Despite economic problems in Japan, Asia's Pacific Rim remains one of the most rapidly growing regions in the world. Strong economic growth, within the four newly industrialized countries (NICs) - Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, has spread to the other countries in the region. A second tier of countries - Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia - have enjoyed rapid economic progress (average 7 percent GDP growth) as well in the last decade. Growth was between 5 percent and 8 percent in 1992 and slightly higher in 1993 (Table 1). Asia's Pacific Rim and

Southeast Asia constitute a powerful economic global presence.

Table 1

The Asia's Pacific Rim Countries: Growth in GDP (1993)
(Business Asia, January 1994; Jelacic, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993)

Country	Growth in GDP (annual percentage change)
Hong Kong	4.5
Indonesia	6.4
Japan	2.8
Malaysia	8.6
Phillippines	4.0
Singapore	5.8
South Korea	6.6
Taiwan	8.2
Thailand	7.8

Thailand's Growing Economy

Thailand has emerged as one of the most dynamic economies in Southeast Asia after enjoying a decade of rapid growth. Having maintained an average economic growth rate of 5.9% between 1983 and 1992, Thailand is well positioned for an economic takeoff that could turn it into one of the fastest growing economies within Southeast Asia and Asia's Pacific Rim. Thailand's assets include a diversified manufacturing sector, an increasingly sophisticated services industry, and a

well-developed agro-industrial sector. In 1993, Thailand's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth was 7.8%. This has resulted from escalating domestic demand, private consumptions, imports, and exports (partly from the government easing the restrictions on international business - imports and exports) as well as increased private and government investments (Bowman, 1993; Fairclough, 1993). Such performance makes Thailand an attractive and dynamic country and offers one of the best opportunities for international business and marketing (Dubin, 1993; Jelacic, 1993; Kelly, 1992).

Role and Importance of Negotiations

Negotiations have emerged as one of the most critical factor in the process of conducting international business (Fayerweather & Kapoor, 1976). Perlmutter (1983) estimated that over 50% of international manager's time is spent negotiating. In addition, the process of negotiation has been identified as one of the single most important international business skills (Bryan & Buck, 1989; Fayerweather & Kapoor, 1976; Kapoor, 1974). However, McCall and Warrington (1984) suggested:

The face-to-face elements in marketing have largely been ignored ... marketing strategy is only as good as its implementation, and that implementation depends on the people who span organizational boundaries and whose work is aimed at creating various kinds of agreements. It is punctuated by the negotiations through which such agreements are made and put into operation, revised, or terminated (p. 3).

With the push toward increasing economic integration, the importance of understanding the cultural domain of marketing negotiations becomes even more vital (Kale & Barnes, 1992). The ever increasing opportunities to market products and services globally cannot be optimally capitalized upon unless the cultural domain of the buyer-seller dyad is better understood.

Cultural Influences on Negotiations

The influence of culture on the negotiation process has been recognized by many researchers. Hawrysh and Zaichkowsky (1990) suggested that:

Culture's causal significance to negotiations is not in defining ends or outcomes of action but in the process or strategy of bargaining. Therefore, once a negotiator is aware of another culture's "tool kit," he or she should be able to anticipate and understand the behavior that takes place in the bargaining environment and respond with confidence (pp. 28-29).

Kapoor (1974) indicated that:

The unique characteristic of international versus domestic business negotiations is that international negotiations are influenced by a wide diversity of environments that require changing perspectives which determine the selection of appropriate tactics and strategies of negotiations to be adopted. Specific groups in different environments have their own concept of "right," "reasonable," or "appropriate" in negotiations; each group also has its own expectations of the likely response of an opposing group to an issue, event or mood determined by its "self reference criterion" - that is, the unconscious reference to one's own cultural values (p. 3).

Harris and Moran (1987, pp. 55-56) also indicated that "there are many differences in the negotiation process from culture to culture and they involve language, cultural conditioning, negotiation styles, approaches to problem solving, implicit assumptions, gestures and facial expressions, and the role of ceremony and formality."

In summary, there are cultural variations in negotiation behaviors and styles among different culture/countries and it is culture that influences the negotiation process, and thereby may affect the negotiation outcomes. Thus, a key factor in improving cultural interactions in negotiations is understanding how specific cultural differences are likely to affect the negotiation strategy, process and outcomes (Beliaev, et al., 1985).

Statement of the Problem

Problems of Business Negotiations with Asians

The many problems encountered in international business negotiations between Asians and Westerners are well documented (Graham & Sano, 1986; Hall, 1976; Tung, 1984). Asians' cultural heritage develops independently of the West as well, and in its own right incredibly diverse. It has resulted in their own unique ways of doing business and negotiating. They generally place a great deal of emphasis on interpersonal relations and tend to incorporate that in their business negotiations (i.e., Tung, 1982; Graham & Sano, 1989). Thus, non-Asian business managers often have many problems when negotiating with Asian business managers.

The problems for non-Asian business managers in business negotiations with Asian managers are mainly the insufficient awareness and understanding, appreciation and sensitivity of: (1) cultural differences (business customs and etiquette); (2) role and status of interpersonal relations; (3) personalities and characteristics; (4) negotiation process and strategy; and (5) verbal and non-verbal communication/behavior (Graham & Sano, 1986; Negotiating in Asia, 1991).

These lead to communication problems (language, verbal and nonverbal behaviors), and miscommunications (misperception, misinterpretation, misevaluation) which may, in turn, lead to the collapse of agreements.

All of the previous discussion justifies the critical need for doing an empirical comparative study of the face-to-face negotiations relative to Thailand and the United States. Therefore, the focus of this study was to provide insight into group similarities and/or differences of negotiation strategy, process, and behavior among American and Thai middle-level marketing managers.

Purpose of the Study

This study was a conceptual replication and extension of the comparative studies of marketing negotiations carried out by Professor John L. Graham and his colleagues: Adler, Brahm and Graham (1992); and Graham, Evenko and Rajan (1992). It was based on social psychology and exchange theories as well as game and bargaining, and communication theories. It sought to extend the aforementioned studies in that it represented the first empirical comparative study of face-to-face marketing negotiations of a specific management level.

Further, it explored negotiations of subjects in a specific function (wholesale distributor), and in a specific industry (audio-video equipment industry).

The research empirically compared and contrasted negotiation strategy, process, and behavior between American and Thai subjects via analysis of:

1. The two-person, buyer-seller negotiation simulations compared and contrasted by using payoff matrices and post-negotiation questionnaires; and
2. Content analysis of the videotape recordings of both verbal and nonverbal behaviors (conversational form and content) during the negotiation simulations.

The proposed model integrated the key variables that were included in the models of the aforementioned studies by Graham et al. The model served as:

1. An effort to identify how negotiator characteristics and situational constraint (independent variables or exogenous constructs), and the negotiation process (mediating or process variables or endogenous constructs) determine negotiation outcomes (dependent variables).
2. The basis for performing the comparative analysis of marketing negotiations. Key variables which were compared and contrasted include: (1) negotiation

process including strategies and attractiveness; (2) negotiation behaviors consisting of verbal and nonverbal behaviors (conversational form and content) during the interactions; and (3) negotiation outcomes including profits (both individual and joint) and satisfaction.

The detailed discussion of the proposed model and constructs is presented in Chapter III.

Rationale for the Study

The significance of insight and true understanding of face-to-face marketing negotiations in different country/culture is critical for optimally capitalizing on the increasing opportunities of marketing products and services globally. Thailand's growing economy and the conditions that offer international business opportunities are driving forces requiring the comprehension and recognition of marketing negotiations in Thailand. In addition, a comparative study of face-to-face marketing negotiations in Thailand and the U.S. has thus far received no scholarly investigation in the international marketing literature.

Justification of the Study

Specifically, the contributions of this research will be twofold:

improved understanding and insight into the strategy/process in the context of the structure that will assist the international managers to adapt and adopt more effectively to accomplish the negotiation objectives. The proposed model enhances the understanding of the types of variables in the negotiation process which affect the negotiation and optimal outcomes.

It is anticipated that the comprehensive realization of this study will serve the following purposes:

Encourage the systematic research that account many interdependent phenomena and understanding of marketing negotiations.

Identify areas of research that are conducive in developing a comprehensive perspective.

Encourage the extension of study at different specific management level and industry that might avoid macro-strategic value in specific situations.

It is also expected that the findings will be useful to theorists and international managers in developing effective negotiation strategies.

1. An improved understanding and insight into negotiation strategy/process in the context of a different culture that will assist the international marketing managers to adapt and adopt more effective strategies to accomplish the negotiation objectives.

2. The proposed model enhances the knowledge and understanding of the types of variables impacting on the negotiation process which affect the satisfactory conclusion and optimal outcomes.

It is anticipated that the comprehensive conceptualization of this study will serve three functions:

1. Encourage the systematic research that takes into account many interdependent phenomena relevant to the understanding of marketing negotiations.

2. Identify areas of research that should be productive in developing a comprehensive perspective.

3. Encourage the extension of study to the different specific management level, industry, and country that might avoid macro-strategic orientation of limited value in specific situations.

It is also expected that the findings will be useful to theorists and international negotiators in developing effective negotiation programs and strategies

as well as assisting practitioners to better comprehend negotiation strategy, process and behavior in other cultures.

Scope and Limitations

Since this study was a comparative study, two kinds of interactions/dyads: Thai and Thai, and U.S. and U.S. were compared and contrasted. The key variables which were compared and contrasted include negotiation strategy, process, and behavior. Since this study was basically a conceptual replication as previously discussed, the research methodology used in this study was the same as those of Professor Graham's with some adaptations to be consistent with the purpose of the study.

Limitations of the study include:

1. Since this study was not a cross-cultural study, it did not investigate the interaction dynamics of U.S. and Thai marketing managers (U.S./Thai dyad).
2. To insure comparability, the subjects of this study were limited to American and Thai middle-level marketing managers of the consumer electronics wholesale distributor operations. Findings, therefore, are not appropriate as a basis for generalization.

3. Not all possible negotiation variables can be included in this study. This study included only those key variables which have been identified in prior research that is being replicated. Some variables previously included in the analysis of negotiations and not included in this study are: (1) honesty, trust, and relationships; (2) power, credibility, and impression formation accuracy; (3) extroversion/introversion, self-esteem, and experience; and (4) similarities of buyer and seller.

Definition of Key Terms

Several of the terms presented below have a variety of meanings in the popular and academic literature. The definitions provided here convey the meaning and intent as used in this study.

Negotiations. Any sequence of written and/or oral communication processes or potentially opportunistic interaction process whereby entities/parties to both common and conflicting business interests and of differing cultural backgrounds consider the form of any joint action/effort they might take in pursuit of their individual objectives or discuss common and

conflicting interests in order to reach an agreement of mutual benefits and interests as well as to obtain long-term relationship (Dupont, 1991; Harris & Moran, 1987; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; McCall & Warrington, 1989). Culture. Culture is a difference in national heritage and permanent residence of the parties in a negotiation (Graham, 1983).

Household Audio and Video Equipment Industry. The products in this industry are classified in Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 3651 which include Hi-Fi Stereo, TV, VCRs, camcorders, laserdisc players, car audio systems and home entertainment products (exclude computers and computer games).

Negotiation Outcomes (The Dependent Variables). These are the results of the negotiation process and measures of success of marketing negotiations (Campbell, et al. 1988; Dwyer, 1980; Graham, 1983, 1984, 1985; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Weitz, 1981). Negotiation outcomes consist of profits (both individual and joint) and satisfaction.

Role of the Negotiators. A description of negotiators' status relationships (e.g., who is buyer and who is seller), which are determined prior to the negotiation situation (Hall, 1976).

Process Variables. Qualitative and quantitative

descriptions of the activities involved in a marketing negotiation (Graham, 1983). Process variables include strategies and behaviors (conversational form and content) negotiators use during the negotiation process as well as attractiveness.

Negotiation Strategy. Mode of communication or behavior/orientation or the effort/course of action of the negotiator to communicate and/or to influence the counterpart's behavior communication, attitude, course of action, negotiation outcomes and relationships (Angelmar & Stern, 1978; Krippendorff, 1969; Pool, 1969; Walton & McKersie, 1965).

Problem-Solving Approach. A set of negotiation behaviors that are cooperative, integrative, and information-exchange-oriented (Campbell, et al., 1988).

Attractiveness (Interpersonal Attraction). A process-related variable which is the descriptor of negotiation strategies and the relationship, and thus process measures that can strongly influence negotiation outcomes such as like/dislike, friendly/unfriendly feelings (Campbell, et al. 1988; Graham, 1983, 1984).

Conversational Form and Content. Consideration of only verbal content yields inadequate understandings of interpersonal interactions. The form of conversation

refers to the nonverbal and structural aspects of language that provide the necessary ancillary information for accurate interpretation of the content of conversations. Thus the content of conversation is what is said, whereas the form is how it is said (Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1992).

Nonverbal Behavior. Nonverbal behavior refers to what negotiators do rather than what they say. Nonverbal behavior is complex and multifaceted - it delivers multiple messages, many of which are responded to subconsciously (Adler & Graham, 1989). It includes tone of voice, facial expressions and gazing, touching, and silences.

Negotiation Simulations. Experiments in a laboratory under partially controlled conditions where an explicit effort is made to replicate (i.e., to simulate) some of the essential features of the referent world (Sawyer & Guetzkow, 1965).

Content Analysis. Research technique or procedure for the objective, systematic description of the communication content and for making inferences both about the source of message and about the effects of a message upon its receivers (Berelson, 1952; Holsti, 1968; Osgood, 1959). It is the method for the analysis

of negotiator's communications/behaviors (conversational content).

Summary

This chapter provides the background information explaining the importance of the problem, the research purpose, rationale and justification of the study, scope and limitations, and definition of key terms. Chapter II provides a comprehensive review and assessment of existing literature relevant to the study.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is: (1) to present a review of the previous research/literature which provides the theoretical background and perspectives, and the relevance of previous research to the current study; and (2) to assemble the findings of previous studies relevant to this research. This review does not cover all the available literature of negotiations but only those studies directly congruent with the current research. This chapter consists of five sections:

1. A review of the definitions and concepts of negotiations, the historical perspectives of the relationship between culture and negotiation, and the comparative studies of negotiations in different cultures/countries (culturally-based negotiation styles or international negotiation styles).

2. A review of relevant literature on theories pertaining to negotiations.

3. A review of relevant literature on the key variables under investigation.

4. A review of Graham's models of negotiations.

5. A review of relevant literature on Thai culture and values as well as Thai negotiation behavior.

Negotiations, Comparative Studies of International Business/Marketing Negotiations in Different Cultures, and Historical Perspectives of the Relationship between Culture and Negotiation

Definitions and Concepts of Negotiations

Negotiation has its original meanings in a sense of leisure and quality life as Carlisle and Parker (1989) stated:

The word "negotiation" has its root in the Latin word "otium" meaning "leisure." **Neg-otium** became current as the slave population in Rome dwindled and Romans discovered they had less and less spare time. Thus they negotiated for their leisure, their pursuit of quality life (p. 35).

Therefore, all negotiations should be a means of achieving an enhanced quality of life and work (Carlisle and Parker, 1989, p. 35).

Ikle (1964) provided the basic characteristics of negotiations:

Two elements must normally be present for negotiations to take place; there must be both common interests and issues of conflict. Without common interests there is nothing to negotiate for, without conflicting issues nothing to negotiate about (p. 2).

Therefore, there is no point in negotiating if the parties do not understand that they can accomplish some common interest. For negotiations to happen, the parties must have some issues of conflict which are to be resolved. Although the parties have a number of conflicting issues, both of them expect to achieve a common objective.

Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965) defined negotiation somewhat consistently as:

A process through which two or more parties - individuals, groups or larger social units - interact in developing potential agreements to provide guidance and regulations of their future behavior (p. 466).

Also, Druckman (1977) defined negotiations as:

A method of social decisionmaking. It differs from forms of decision-making that involve choices against the environment; it consists of choices against another person or party and is accomplished by persuasion and haggling (p. 41).

Putnam and Jones (1982) defined bargaining and pointed out the differences between negotiation and bargaining as:

A process whereby two or more parties with divergent aims, motives, or interests attempts to settle what each shall give and take or perform and receive, in a transaction between them. The parties engaged in this process are interdependent as they use proposals, counterproposals, and compromises to reach mutually acceptable outcomes. Hence, negotiation employs trade-offs as the dominant **modus operandi** for managing conflict. But bargaining involves more than an assimilation of trade-offs; it is a communicative process characterized by the exchange of information, arguments, and strategic maneuvers (pp. 171-172).

Thus an important starting point for any negotiation is having the motivation to reach an agreement (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Mastenbroek, 1983; Stephenson, 1971; Walton & McKersie, 1965).

Pruitt (1981) also defined negotiation somewhat consistently, as:

A process by which a joint decision is made by two or more parties. The parties first verbalize contradictory demands and then move toward agreement by a process of concession making or searching for new alternatives (p. 1).

Pruitt (1981) also suggested that it is a process in which two or more parties make decisions to resolve conflicting reasoning and interests.

Mastenbroek (1983) also indicated that "negotiation is likely when individuals' interests are different or opposed, but there is also a high degree of dependence on an agreement that has advantages for all parties" (p. 77).

Lax and Sebenius (1986) characterized negotiation somewhat consistently also, as:

A process of potentially opportunistic interaction by which two or more parties, with some apparent conflict, seek to do better through jointly decided action than they could otherwise (p. 11).

Thus key elements of negotiation, according to Lax and Sebenius (1986), consist of interdependence, some perceived conflict, opportunistic interaction, and the possibility of agreement.

Harris and Moran (1987) defined negotiation as "a process in which two or more entities come together to discuss common and conflicting interests in order to reach an agreement of mutual benefit" (p. 55).

In summary, the aforementioned definitions of negotiation contains many key inherent factors or variables in common; that is, entity (individual/group/party/organization), motivation/objectives, process, interaction, communication/relationship, behavior,

environment, conditions (situation constraints), (common) interests, (issues of) conflict, strategy (means or methods/approaches for accomplishment or success), and decision and agreement (outcome).

In a purchasing/industrial marketing context, Dobler, Lee, and Burt (1984) defined negotiation as: "the decision-making process through which a buyer and a seller establish the terms of a purchase agreement which is a fundamental phenomenon in interfirm exchange behavior in industrial markets" (p. 212). Alderson (1957) referred to negotiation as the "crowning process of business effort" (p. 133). In addition, Bonoma and Johnston (1978) suggested that industrial purchases are best viewed as "negotiated settlements" (p. 218).

Finally, in an international context, cultural considerations and business interests are interrelated. McCall and Warrington (1989) defined negotiation as:

Negotiation is any sequence of written and/or oral communication processes whereby parties to both common and conflicting commercial interests and of differing cultural backgrounds consider the form of any joint action they might take in pursuit of their individual objectives which will define or redefine the terms of their interdependence (p. 15).

Historical Perspectives of the Relationship between Culture and Negotiation (Culture-Negotiation Relationship): The Rationale-Economics Approach vs. The Situational/Individual Factors-Social Psychology Approach

The concept of the relationship of culture to negotiation style is an important one since it points to a current view of negotiation which differs considerably from the early negotiation theorists. The early students of negotiation/bargaining theory were frequently economists who developed process models that considered various concession patterns and optimal solutions for various negotiating problems. Often these authors/researchers assume a "rational" actor/negotiator who was engaged in maximizing his or her own outcome in a negotiating encounter. Such "rational" perspectives were directed to the subject matter being negotiated. However, the early models left little room for unconscious factors in the whole process of negotiation.

Historical Development and Perspective

Economists and mathematicians have long been interested in theories of bargaining as they relate to economic decision making in general. Originating primarily in 1881, Edgeworth's study suggested that in price-quantity negotiations a contract will be

reached which maximizes joint payoff. This solution, which corresponds to the one suggested by Pareto in 1909, is traditionally referred to as being "Pareto optimal" (i.e., no other solution is better for all participants in the negotiations). Such a solution was suggested by Schumpeter in his introduction to Zeuthen's work (1930), as well as by Stigler (1952), who used the "all-or-none" form of bargaining (In "all-or-none" bargaining a single offer is made which must either be accepted in its entirety or rejected). The most complete treatment of the general bargaining problem was presented by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1947 in their treatise, "The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior". Their solution corresponds to the division of maximum joint profits.

The general model developed by Nash (1950) results in a solution which is the only one satisfying the following "reasonable" assumptions: (1) invariance with respect to utility transformations; (2) Pareto optimality; (3) independence of irrelevant alternatives; and (4) symmetry. The unique solution under these four conditions maximizes the product of the participants' utility functions. If utility is assumed to be linear

in money, this solution corresponds to an equal division of maximum joint profits. A fifty-fifty split of maximum joint profits was suggested by Pigou in 1908, and also corresponds to the solution specified by Schelling (1960) as the apparent one. Schelling, however, is one of the few researchers to explicitly stipulate that his solution depends on the fact that the "value of the game" be known to the participants.

Despite the extensive historical development of various theories about the resolution of bargaining in economic settings, the scope of traditional economic and mathematical analysis was not sufficient to eliminate a variety of alternative hypotheses. Missing were experimental analyses of bargaining behavior. It was not until the 1950s that developments in game and conflict theories provided the means to construct theories of bargaining which are testable by the use of experimental procedures.

The use of experimental procedures to study economic decision-making is generally regarded to have its origins in the extensive theoretical and experimental research published in 1960 and 1963 by L. E. Fouraker, an economist, and the late S. Siegel,

a psychologist. In their own words, Siegel and Fouraker employed " . . . the methods of experimental social psychology in the study of behavior which has been considered in the theoretical province of economics." (1960, p. 72).

Siegel and Fouraker (1960) investigated various forms of the market situations usually referred to as bilateral monopoly, where a single buyer must negotiate a price and quantity agreement with a single seller. In general, their experiments supported the theoretical proposition that contracts will be negotiated at the quantity maximizing joint payoffs, but the price agreement at this quantity is indeterminate.

A considerable portion of the Siegel-Fouraker research was directed toward studying some of the influences on the variability in negotiated contracts. Siegel and Fouraker (1960) concluded that there are a number of different variables which can influence bargaining behavior, including the amount of profit involved, the amount of information each bargainer has about the potential rewards an opponent can receive, and each participant's level of aspiration. They attribute much of the variability in their research results to personal differences among the participants.

Fouraker and Siegel (1963) studied oligopolistic bargaining using price and quantity adjuster models using both two and three sellers. As was the case in their first study (1960), Fouraker and Siegel were interested in two major influences upon bargaining:

(1) Information effects (the effect of information on the quantity agreement among bilateral monopoly bargainers - three experimental information conditions were used; complete-complete information, where both bargainers had the other's payoff table, complete-incomplete, where one bargainer had the counterpart's payoff table and the other did not, and incomplete-incomplete, where neither bargainer had the counterpart's payoff table. Bargainers with complete information were told the amount of information given their counterpart; the bargainers with incomplete information were given no indication of their counterpart's information level). The results of the experiment confirmed the Siegel-Fouraker hypothesis that increasing information will reduce the variability about the joint maximizing quantity and contracts were concluded notably more rapidly under the complete-complete information condition than the other two conditions.

(2) Personal or individual differences (the characteristics of the bargainer in terms of the strategy used in attempts to achieve a price-quantity agreement with the opponent). The strategies that Siegel and Fouraker (1960) observed led them to identify three specific bargaining types or "signaling strategies": cooperator, individualistic, and rivalistic. They found that cooperators seemed interested in maximizing the sum of joint profits, individualists in maximizing their own profits, and rivalists (or competitors) in maximizing the difference between their profit and that of their rivals. Not every bargainer could be classified into one of these three groups, and different bargainers might use quite different strategies in arriving at the same price-quantity agreement. In addition, they also found that the structure of the bargaining game influenced the proportion of each type of bargainer. In fact, Siegel and Fouraker (1960) were able to induce specific types of bargaining strategies by altering the reward structure of the negotiation exercise.

The Rationale-Economics Approach vs.
The Situational/Individual Factors - Social
Psychology Approach

The rational actor model of the negotiation process is one of the important models since it has yielded important insights about the nature of the phenomenon. However, it is more critical to consider that an alternative (rather, complementary) view must also be elaborated in order to facilitate understanding of negotiation-culture relationship. This second perspective on negotiation (e.g., Blaker, 1977; Graham & Sano, 1984; Sawyer & Guetzkow, 1965; Van Zandt, 1970), attempts to account for situational and individual factors, including culture, in the process of negotiation.

These two perspectives - one is based on economics, the other on social psychology have created the critical separation in the negotiation literature. This leads to another gap which is existed between practitioners and academics. Since the goals of the scholar and the participant-observer of negotiation differ somewhat, there has been a tendency to dismiss or downplay the problems of definition and conceptualization in the investigation of the various "contributory" factors to the phenomenon of negotiation, including the question

of the impact of culture on the process of negotiation. However, since the consideration of national styles and cultural differences is critical and essential to the practitioner's interest in behavior of international negotiation, the failure to establish a fruitful approach/perspective on the subject may have inhibited the development of a truly comparative perspective.

Culture-Negotiation Relationship

Janosik (1987) identified four conceptually distinct approaches in the negotiation literature which imply for the understanding of the culture-negotiation connection.

1. Culture as learned behavior. The focus of this approach is primarily on what negotiators do, rather than what they think as well as the reliability and sensitivity of the observer. Most of the observations derived from this approach, which based on experience, involve comments on negotiating "etiquette," - on matters dealing with proper social customs and usages (e.g., Van Zandt, 1970).

2. Culture as shared value. The emphasis of this approach is on a description of a controlling concept or value assumed to be embedded in the culture and

derives from that observation a series of predictions about how a participant in that culture will behave in negotiation. The basic assumption of this approach is thinking precedes doing, and that one's thinking patterns derive from one's cultural context.

Research of this approach focuses on searching for a central cultural value or norm that distinguishes each of the groups being compared (e.g., Graham & Sano, 1984; Mushakoji, 1976; Samelson, 1976; Young, 1968). Another key assumption is either a single shared value, a commonly-held cluster of values produce a typical negotiation style. That is, a homogeneity in the culture's dominant value. Thus, this approach attempts to create a cultural explanation for behavior rather than a description of a pattern of negotiation behavior. This approach also minimizes the role of individual choice for the negotiator.

3. Culture as dialectic. For this approach, culture is defined by the tensions, the dialectics, which exist among values embedded in a particular culture. Tension, not consistency; typifies the component parts of any given culture. This approach can accommodate the study of both individual variations in a culture and changes over period of time

(e.g., Blaker, 1977). It also allows for the resolution of several persistent questions concerning the observed lack of uniformity in the negotiating behavior among the participants of a particular culture.

This approach, however, has its drawbacks: (1) it does not present the intellectual difficulties regarding change and choice that were noted in connection with "culture as shared value," (2) it is not deterministic in the same sense as the first two approaches (theoretically, one could equally expect quite contrary behaviors from participants in such a dialectic culture).

4. Culture-in-context. Three key components of this approach include individual's personality, cultural values, and the social context in which the individual operates. This multicausal models of negotiating behavior are typical of many academic analyses of negotiating behavior (e.g., Sawyer & Guetzkow, 1965; Druckman et al., 1976; Janosik, 1983). The emphasis of this multicausal approach/model is to encompass the cultural factor into perspective with other relevant factors such as the negotiator characteristics and situational factors (those factors which define the context of the negotiation).

Janosik (1987) indicated that the main advantage of the first two approaches to culture and negotiation is that they yield readily usable lists of do's and don'ts, of straightforward characterizations of the negotiation styles of individuals from other cultures. The third and fourth approaches, by contrast, involve increasing degrees of indeterminacy. Therefore, practitioners prefer to employ the "culture as learned behavior" or the "culture as shared value" approaches; the academics more frequently use the "culture as dialectic" or "culture in context" approaches. The reasons are that the first two approaches allow a high degree of predictability concerning the negotiating behavior of the culture group being analyzed. The third and fourth approaches are rather less deterministic. The "culture as dialectic" and "culture in context" approaches make prediction a more complex undertaking/effort.

The historical two different perspectives on negotiation: rationale-economics and situational/individual factors-social psychology as well as the four distinct approaches in the negotiation literature which imply a connection between culture and negotiation is illustrated in Figure 1.




Figure 1 The Rationale-Economics vs. Situational/Culture - Social Psychology Approaches

Comparative Studies of International Business/Marketing Negotiations in Different Cultures: Culturally-Based Negotiation Styles (International Negotiating Style)

There is a growing literature exists concerning culturally-based negotiation styles or documenting international negotiating styles over the past two decades. For example, there are articles describing the negotiating behavior of Japanese (Graham, 1983, 1985b, 1988; Graham & Sano, 1986; March, 1989; Tung, 1984; Van Zandt, 1970), Chinese (Eiteman, 1990; Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Pye, 1982; Graham & Lin, 1987; Lee, 1989; Stewart & Keown, 1989; Tang & Kirkbride, 1986; Tung, 1982a, 1982b), French (Dupont, 1982; Plantey, 1980), Soviet Russians (Beliaev, Mullen, & Punnett, 1985; Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1992), Brazilian (Graham, 1983, 1985b), Latin American (Mendoza, 1988), Middle Eastern Arabs (Wright, 1981; Muna, 1980), and along with a number of multicountry studies (Harnett & Cummings, 1980; Adler, Schwarz, & Graham, 1987; Campbell et al., 1988; Graham et al., 1988). Thus negotiation processes/behaviors/styles clearly vary across across cultures/countries (Adler, 1990; Bryan & Buck, 1989; Condon, 1974; Fisher, 1980; Glenn, Witmeyer, & Stevenson, 1977; Graham, 1983; Graham & Sano, 1989; Harris & Moran, 1987; Tung, 1982a, 1984a, 1984b), Van Zandt, 1970).

Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965) discussed the national character of the negotiator and suggested that different nations have different negotiation styles. Researchers (e.g., Adler, 1990; Hawrysh & Zaichkowsky, 1990) also supported this concept. Tung (1982) concluded that as a determinant of the success or failure of negotiations, culture played an important role. Thus, studies have found some variations in negotiating behavior/style due to country or culture.

Furthermore, there is also a growing recognition of the importance of negotiations and buyer-seller influence processes (Clopton, 1984; Dwyer & Walker, 1981; Frazier & Summers, 1984; Reingen & Woodside, 1981; Weitz, 1981). Studies in the international marketing literature regarding international marketing negotiations include Campbell et al., (1988), Graham (1983, 1984, 1985). Sheth (1981) provided a useful theoretical context for studies of international marketing negotiations. Graham (1984) compared Japanese and American marketing negotiations and Campbell et al. (1988) compared marketing negotiations in France, Germany, the United Kingdom with those in the United States.

Theoretical Background/Perspective

The literature/research on negotiations that constitutes different theories which are relevant to the study includes:

1. The literature based on game and bargaining theories.
2. The literature based on social exchange theory, including the literature from the field of communication
3. The literature based on international relations.

The first two groups are concerned with theoretical studies and the last one relevant to application or empirical studies.

Game and Bargaining Theories

According to bargaining theory, when parties have a conflict of interest and desire to resolve the same for their mutual benefit, they have to bargain. Thus, bargaining is a process of social interaction, where each party tries to maximize its gains or minimize its losses. The theories of bargaining are based on the assumptions that: (1) the bargainers have some incentive to reach an agreement which focuses on a situation of

bilateral monopoly; (2) there is a high level of mutual dependence in the bargaining relationship and the relationship is competitive in nature - an increase in the benefits of one party leads to a decrease in the benefits of the other; (3) the bargainers have perfect information on their own and other parties' situation and on the possible outcome of the bargaining process.

Nash (1950, 1953) applied game theory to bargaining, and provided a set of rules explaining how rational actors choose their strategy. Two key strategies in bargaining are cooperation and competition.

Although game theory assists the understanding of the conduct, progress, and outcome of negotiations in the form of utilities and payoffs, it has several limitations: (1) unrealistic assumptions; (2) game theory ignores the significance of structural and contextual environments of negotiations; and (3) the subjects often used in the experiments (a sample of college students) do not represent the business reality. Game theory, as applied to the context of international business negotiations and business negotiations, generally has its limitation in a lack of

realism. Strauss (1978) explained that game theory often provides a "spuriously simplistic explanation (or interpretation) of the complex phenomenon of negotiations" (p. 8).

Chamberlain (1951, 1955) proposed the concept of bargaining power, which is defined as a capacity of a party to conclude an agreement on its own terms. Chamberlain and Kuhn's (1965) theory of bargaining power is compatible with the views held by social psychologists such as Thibaut and Kelley (1959) and Emerson (1962), that bargaining is in fact based on dependence or interdependence in the social relationship.

Walton and Mckersie (1965) suggested four subprocesses of bargaining: distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining, attitudinal structuring and interorganizational bargaining. These subprocesses and their interrelationship provide a useful insight into the interaction of bargainers. The main contribution of the study is that it extended the bargaining theory beyond its traditional focus onto a situation of bilateral monopolists who are bargaining to divide a fixed sum of resources. The major deficiencies of the

study are that it neither specified the dimensions of the bargaining relationship nor related this relationship to the environment.

Rapoport (1960) and Cross (1966) suggested that the bargaining theory based on game theory:

(1) neglects the issues and phenomena which are critical for bargaining, such as the bargaining process and environmental constraints; (2) is unable to provide an insight into the bargaining process, as its assumptions identify and remove all the obstacles which confront the bargainers. Such assumptions as perfect information are somewhat unrealistic; and (3) emphasizes the bargainers and bargaining environments with very little attention given to the bargaining process.

Social Exchange Theory

Sociologists, social psychologists, and social anthropologists have developed the concept of exchange in interpersonal relationships within a societal environment (Homans, 1958; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Homans' (1958) propositions about interpersonal behavior suggested that interaction is a process in which two participants carry out activities directed toward another and exchange valuable resources.

Exchange is one of the core concepts in marketing theory (Bagozzi, 1975; Kotler, 1972). Many researchers has described marketing as a social exchange process (e.g., Bonoma, 1976; Bagozzi, 1978). Bonoma (1976) emphasized interdependence, conflict and influence while Bagozzi (1978) defined this exchange as a social process constrained by economic and psychological factors.

The emphasis of Evans' (1963) study was on the behavior of individuals (salesman-customer), not on the relationship between them. Thibaut and Kelley (1959) proposed the socio-psychological base of Evans' theory which explained the interaction interferences. Evans' basic theory was that the more similar the parties in a dyad are, the more likely a favorable outcome, a sale.

Fouraker and Siegel's (1963) experimentally study, based on bargaining games, investigated negotiations in marketing relations. The study found that the amount of experience affected the process. The findings of the study were limited because there was no face-to-face interaction and the process was not the object of the study.

Other experimental studies that emphasize on the interaction context between buyer and seller (face-to-face communication) include Green, Gross and Robinson, 1967; Mathews, Wilson and Monoky, 1972; Pennington, 1968; and Pruitt and Lewis, 1975.

Communication, Negotiations and Social Exchange Theory

Communication is one of the key variables in literature regarding negotiation and social exchange. Dance (1977) and Gumperz (1978) explained communication as "cooperative endeavor" in interaction. Porter (1972), supported by Condon (1974), proposed eight categories in the social context of cross-cultural communication such as language and language behavior, nonverbal behavior, values, and patterns of thought.

Bonoma and Felder (1977), based on Porter's (1972) study, suggested the integration of verbal and non-verbal behavior in a content analysis scheme. Angelmar and Stern (1978) applied content analysis to negotiating communications by use of a theoretically category system. Graham (1980) found that communication leads to "understanding" which is a function of three groups of variables; verbal behavior, non-verbal behavior and social context.

International Relations

Ikle (1964) proposed the concept of complementary interests that the negotiation process can have important effects which do not concern the agreement. These side effects may be one of the reasons that the parties get together to negotiate (Hall, 1960; Kennedy, 1965; Sawyer & Guetzkow, 1965; Williams, 1965; Druckman, 1977; Hamner & Yukl, 1977; Winham, 1977; and Strauss, 1978).

Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965), in the context of social psychology and international relations, developed a model of negotiations for the study of negotiations between parties from varying environments and identified five categories of variables - goals, background factors, conditions, process, and outcome. The outcome is a direct result of the process.

Two major limitations of Sawyer and Guetzkow's model are: (1) although the model incorporates the feedback loops, it is subjective; and (2) the model does not incorporate the macroeconomic and institutional level variables as well as individual characteristics and behavior. However, the social

psychological approach of the model provides the implications for marketing managers and marketing researchers (e.g., Graham, 1980, 1987a; Graham & Sano, 1986; Kapoor, 1974).

Key Variables

Negotiation Outcomes

Negotiation outcomes have been operationalized in many ways in different studies. Pennington (1968), in a field study of buyer/seller interactions, used sale versus no sale as a measure of negotiation effectiveness. Some social psychologists often used profits attained by negotiators in negotiation simulations as a measure in negotiation experiments (e.g., Rubin & Brown, 1975).

Profits (both individual and joint) in negotiation simulations have been used as dependent measures in marketing studies (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Lewis & Fry, 1977; Dwyer & Walker, 1981; Graham, 1981, 1983; Clopton, 1984). Weitz (1981) suggested that the most appropriate measures of negotiation effectiveness are individual economic outcomes of sellers and satisfaction of their clients. The criteria for selling effectiveness are the individual economic

outcomes of sellers and satisfaction of their clients (or buyers) over the anticipated duration of the relation (Campbell, et al., 1988).

Negotiation satisfaction is an important measure of success of interorganizational transactions. Dwyer (1980) developed and tested the reliability of a scale for measuring satisfaction of negotiations in laboratory studies. The scale consists of three dimensions of satisfaction: (1) satisfaction with rewards; (2) satisfaction with counterpart's rewards; and (3) satisfaction with own performance.

Graham (1985b) found that when the outcomes of negotiations were measured as profits and satisfaction, there was no difference between cross-cultural negotiations of Japanese/Americans versus intracultural dyads of Japanese/Japanese or American/American.

Allerheiligen, Graham, and Lin (1985) reported on profits and satisfaction as outcomes, found that: (1) profit was unrelated to honesty; (2) the Japanese negotiators were more satisfied when they rated their own strategies as honest; and (3) for Taiwanese negotiators, satisfaction was associated with the use of deceptive negotiation strategies, as were higher profits.

Weitz (1981) argued against the use of mutual negotiation solutions as the best measure of success, even though the majority of studies in this area focused on joint outcomes as the dependent variable. Graham (1986) agreed with this conceptualization of effectiveness. The most appropriate goal of industrial sales negotiations is twofold: maximization of sources' profits and targets' satisfaction.

Negotiation Process Variables

Key negotiation process variables in this study include: (1) strategies; (2) attractiveness; and (3) conversational form and content.

Negotiation Strategies

Negotiation strategies can be conceived to fall along a representational/instrumental continuum. Its theoretical basis is represented by two research theories: (1) communication theory which consists of two modes of communication - the representational and the instrumental (Krippendorff, 1969; Pool, 1969; Angelmar & Stern, 1978); (2) research on psychological state which includes

cooperative/individualistic orientation (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Rubin & Brown, 1975). Angelmar and Stern (1978) suggested a close relationship between psychological states and behaviors. That is, cooperative negotiators tend to use representational communications, and individualistic negotiators tend to use instrumental communications.

Two basic models of communication include the representational (expressive) and the instrumental (manipulative) model (Krippendorff, 1969; Pool, 1969). According to the representational model, the function of communication is to transmit information about certain states of nature. The instrumental model, by contrast, is concerned with the effects of communications. Communication is analyzed with a view to the objectives which the source attempts to attain by means of communication.

Representational communication is necessary for integrative negotiation (Walton & McKersie, 1965) where problem identification, search for solutions, and selection of the most appropriate course of action are the primary objectives. Examples of representational communications include information about the parties'

views of the situation and the reporting of their respective utility functions. Instrumental communication is used to affect the other party's behavior (distributive or fixed-sum negotiation) and attitudes (attitudinal structuring) (Walton & McKersie, 1965). It includes threats, promises, commitments, rewards, and punishments. Schelling (1960) concentrated on the instrumental function of communication during negotiation whereas Rapoport (1960) emphasized its integrative/function.

According to Walton and McKersie (1965), two alternative strategies for increasing the profitability of a transaction include distributive and integrative strategies. The distributive strategy consists of one party trying to get the other party to yield such that the former gets more and the latter gets less. Distributive negotiation leads to distribution of a fixed "pie" of outcomes between parties. In contrast, the integrative strategy consists of searching for negotiated solutions that reconcile both parties' interests and yield joint benefits higher than those obtainable by a simple compromise (Pruitt, 1983). Integrative agreements are important because they:

(1) increase the joint benefit of the two parties;
(2) are likely to lead to a mutually accepted agreement in situations in which no distributive agreement would be acceptable to both parties; (3) tend to strengthen the relationship between the parties; and
(4) contribute to a broader community of which the two parties are members (Pruitt, 1983).

Ben Yoav and Pruitt (1982) found that when negotiators are motivated by moderately high aspiration levels in the form of profitability constraints, they are more likely to develop integrative solutions and obtain higher overall profitability. Rinehart (1992) also suggested that both parties in a transaction use integrative strategies to arrive at a mutually beneficial outcome.

Pruitt (1983) classified the negotiation strategies in a different way. Pruitt (1983) suggested four basic strategies: (1) problem solving, which involves an effort to find an alternative that is acceptable to both parties. It involves pursuit of a formula for reconciling the two parties' aspirations; (2) contending, which involves an effort to force one's will on the other party. It involves trying to

persuade the other party to accept alternatives that favor one's own interests; (3) yielding, which involves a reduction in one's underlying goals and values sought (or basic aspirations); and (4) inaction, which involves doing as little as possible in the negotiation. Inaction wastes time and sometimes even temporarily suspends the negotiation.

Pruitt (1983) also noted that these strategies are somewhat incompatible because they require different psychological orientations and tend to send out contradictory signals to the other party. Thus, they are usually adopted one at a time. However, combinations are possible, especially when two strategies can be insulated from one another, such as using contentious strategy in the formal sessions and problem solving in the informal sessions of negotiations.

Pruitt (1983) also suggested two main theories regarding the determinants of choice among the four strategies: (1) the dual concern model traces a negotiator's choice to the relative strength of concern about own and the other party's outcomes; and (2) feasibility considerations that explains this

choice by the perceived feasibility and cost of enacting the various strategies. This involves adopting an explicit problem-solving strategy toward the other - one that is clearly understood as such by the other party.

Competitive or distributive negotiation is the inflexible negotiating behavior which representational boundary role requirements tend to promote frequently. Competitive behavior in negotiations reduces the chances of the buyer and seller reaching mutually beneficial, or integrative, agreements. Specifically, an integrative agreement is one that provides a high level of joint utility and a high level of individual utility to each negotiator (Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975, 1977; Walton & McKersie, 1965).

Competitive negotiation behavior stems largely from a zero-sum or win-lose orientation to negotiators (i.e., one negotiator's gain is the other's loss). The negotiations are viewed as a process for the division of some fixed set of resources (Pruitt, 1981). A competitive strategy refers to a strategy in which the negotiator maintains high levels of aspiration and high limits for negotiation outcomes, and uses very

inflexible behavior aimed at forcing concessions from the other party. Competitive behavior includes the use of threats, promises, persuasive arguments, positional commitments, and the like (Pruitt & Lewis, 1977).

The likelihood of reaching integrative agreements is increased when negotiators avoid competitive behavior and employ coordinative behavior (Pruitt, 1981). Coordinative behavior is facilitated when negotiators adopt a problem-solving orientation to negotiations and show a relatively high degree of trust and cooperation. However, coordinative behavior may occur in the absence of these conditions. One form of coordinative behavior is open and accurate exchange of information by negotiators about the priorities and utilities associated with the issues to be settled (Pruitt, 1981).

Another form of coordinative behavior is termed "heuristic trial and error" (Kelley & Schenitzki, 1972), a type of concession behavior in which a negotiator explores all possible settlements at a given level of utility before conceding to a lower level.

Research indicated that competitive concession behavior on the part of one negotiator tends to produce

reciprocal behavior by the other (Rubin & Brown, 1975). Deutsch and Krauss (1960) found that the quality of dyadic negotiation outcomes was reduced when both parties used competitive tactics. Pruitt (1981) and Pruitt and Lewis (1975, 1977) argued that such behavior impedes negotiators from reaching integrative agreements. Inflexible concession behavior on the part of the seller may force the buyer to make large concessions to reach agreement, in the absence of satisfactory outside alternatives (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981). Alternatively, such seller concession behavior may force the buyer toward a mutually prominent solution such as an equal division of rewards (Schelling, 1960) or may result in failure to reach agreement (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975).

In summary, different researchers use different names for the same concepts or characteristics of strategy.

Problem-Solving Approach - The problem-solving approach (PSA) is a construct developed primarily by social psychologists and primarily refers to the content of conversations (Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1992). The concise definition of a problem-solving

approach is: "a set of negotiation behaviors that are cooperative, integrative, and information-exchange-oriented" (Campbell, et al., 1988, p. 50). Such strategies tend to maximize the number of alternative solutions considered, thus allowing negotiators to optimize outcomes (Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1992). The problem-solving approach (PSA) to marketing negotiations involves first an emphasis on questions and getting information from clients about their needs and preferences. Second, once the buyer's requirements and circumstances are fully understood, then the seller accommodates the product/service offering to the client's needs. The focus is on cooperation and an integrative approach, whereby the needs of both parties are honestly discussed and eventually satisfied (Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986).

Different researchers have used different labels for the PSA concept such as integrative negotiation strategies (Walton & McKersie, 1965), cooperative orientation (Rubin & Brown, 1975), problem-solving orientation (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Menkel-Meadow, 1984), representational negotiation strategies

(Angelmar & Stern, 1978), direct/open influence tactics (Weitz, 1981), but findings have been relatively consistent. Generally, PSA has been found to influence joint negotiation outcomes positively (Campbell, et al., 1988).

Rubin and Brown (1975) suggested that a key determinant of negotiation outcomes is a concept analogous to PSA: motivational orientation (MO) of negotiators. They defined MO as an "attitudinal disposition" toward one's negotiation counterpart, ranging from individualistic to cooperative. Individualistic negotiators seek to maximize their individual negotiation outcomes with no regard for their counterparts' outcomes. Alternatively, cooperative negotiators have a positive interest in their clients' welfare, as well as their own. That is, MO is manipulated through the use of differing negotiation task instructions, reward structures, or pay-off matrices, or by pre-measurement of MO attitudes. In other words, MO is predetermined before the negotiation process begins. Such manipulations have been found to affect both negotiation behaviors and outcomes (Deutsch, 1960; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975).

Rubin and Brown (1975) also suggested that another key determinant of negotiation outcomes is Interpersonal Orientation (IO), the degree to which negotiators adjust their behavior in reaction to counterparts' behaviors.

Frazier and Sommers (1984) found information exchange and requests to positively influence - and recommendations, promises, threats, and legalistic pleas to negatively influence - the occurrence of interfirm agreements. Information exchange clearly fits Angelmar and Stern's (1978) classification of representational strategies, whereas the other variables might be described as instrumental behaviors. Therefore, Frazier and Sommers' findings tended to support the importance of representational negotiation behaviors when the goal (dependent variable) is an interfirm agreement.

Attractiveness (Interpersonal Attraction)

McGuire (1968) suggested that source credibility, power, and attractiveness enhance attitude change. That is, negotiators who are judged to be credible, powerful, and/or attractive by their counterparts will have greater success in changing counterparts'

subjective expected utilities, and concomitantly achieve higher negotiation outcomes (Graham, 1984). Rather than characteristics ascribed to sources of communication, Graham (1983, 1984) considered the three variables as descriptors of negotiation strategies and the relationship, and thus process measures. This view recognizes that measurement of these variables is highly situation-dependent (as well as person-dependent) and cannot be accomplished independent of the interpersonal relationship between parties during the process of a business negotiation.

Interpersonal attraction (like/dislike, friendly/unfriendly feelings) can strongly influence current negotiation outcomes and the success of future transactions (Simons, Berkowit, & Moyer, 1970). Rubin and Brown (1975) also concluded that interpersonal attraction generally enhances negotiation outcomes (Berscheid & Walster, 1978; Morgan & Sawyer, 1967; Swingle, 1966).

However, Rubin and Brown (1975) suggested that interpersonal attraction can "lead to problems of miscoordination that have serious adverse effects" for negotiation outcomes (p. 251). McGuire (1968)

explained that when people were attracted to others they will make sacrifices (e.g., concessions in a negotiation) to preserve the gratifying personal relationships with those of others. Thus an individual negotiator may give up economic rewards for the rewards of a relationship with an attractive partner (Graham, 1985). And to the extent that one receives rewards from a relationship with an attractive other, that person will be more satisfied with the relationship (Graham & Lin, 1987).

Interpersonal attraction might be viewed as an exogenous construct which is determined before negotiations begin as a part of the combination of the negotiators' characteristics. It may also be argued that attraction is a consequence of the negotiation, an outcome construct. However, Campbell, et al., (1988) considered attractiveness as a process-related construct. This is consistent with the view of Evans (1963) which suggests that similarity of negotiators leads to more favorable negotiation outcomes and the view of Zunin and Zunin (1972) which suggests that during the first few minutes of conversation decisions are made about the interpersonal attractiveness and whether to continue the interaction.

Communication Style in Buyer-Seller Negotiations

Conversational Content, Code, Rules and Style. The generally accepted elements of communication include content, code, rules, and style (Anderson, 1972). Content consists of the ideas contained in the message (Anderson, 1972). Code is the verbal and nonverbal form in which the content is relayed (Eisenberg & Smith, 1971). Communication rules are the discipline that binds the code with the content such as grammar, social and/or cultural conventions. Communication style encompasses the other three. Style is the synthesis of content, code, and communication rules into unique and infinite combinations. Therefore, communication style refers to an individual's particular pattern of communication (Barber, 1978). Communication style is an individual's tendency to communicate via unique patterns or combinations of code, content, and communication rules.

Pace (1962), in a study of door-to-door salespeople, rated them on their use of voice, language, eye contact, body movement, and quality of listening, as well as on their overall communication skills. Only the use of language and the overall index were related significantly to performance. The overall

index reflects communication style. Stafford and Greer (1965) investigated preferences for salespeople and found that the person characterized as an "independent shopper" prefers a salesperson with an aggressive style, whereas the "dependent shopper" prefers a salesperson with a less aggressive style.

Sheth (1976) proposed a conceptualization of the buyer-seller interaction process which explicitly recognizes two of these elements: communication content and style. His definition of style as: "representing the format, ritual or mannerism which the buyer and the seller adopt in their interaction" implicitly encompasses the elements of communication code and rules (p. 383). The basic postulate underlying Sheth's conceptual framework was that the outcome of the buyer-seller interaction is a function of both communication content and style.

Sheth (1976) also categorized customers and salespeople, according to their communication styles into three-dimensional: task orientation, self orientation, interaction orientation. The task-oriented style is highly goal oriented and purposeful. The salesperson (customer) using this style is concerned with efficiency and minimizing time,

cost, and effort. The interaction-oriented salesperson (customer) is more personal and social even to the extent of ignoring the task at hand. The self-oriented salesperson (customer) is preoccupied with himself in an interaction, and thus more concerned about his own welfare and less empathetic toward the other person.

Also, Hendon and Hendon (1990) suggested general guidelines for international body language such as the social rules governing nonverbal communication in different countries which consists of six specific peculiarities of body language: face behavior, eye and touch behavior, movements of hand and other body movements.

Conversational Form and Content

Conversational Form Linguistic theory holds that consideration of only verbal content yields inadequate understandings of interpersonal interactions.

Sociolinguistics emphasize the importance of the form of conversation. They focus on the nonverbal and structural aspects of language that provide the necessary ancillary information for accurate interpretation of the content of conversations. The content of conversation is what is said, whereas the

form is how it is said. Several researchers have developed schemes for categorizing the what aspects of negotiations (e.g., Pennington, 1968; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Bonoma & Felder, 1977; Angelmar & Stern, 1978; Donohue, 1981; and Putnam & Jones, 1982b) and have used these schemes to analyze the verbal content of negotiating interactions.

Individuals also provide stylistic signals for interpretation of verbal communications through the use of contextualization cues such as a rise in tone of voice to indicate or underline an important point while interacting (Gumperz, 1979). Gumperz (1979) also suggested that: (1) contextualization cues vary across cultures; (2) they are behaviors learned in the course of the individual's socialization; and (3) the differences in these cues are often the cause of misunderstandings which can have serious consequences in cross-cultural interactions (e.g., terminated negotiations).

Poyatos (1988) and Gumperz (1979) suggested that elements of conversational form which vary across cultures are legion. For example, Brazilian negotiators appear to have a more aggressive style of conversation than with Japanese or American negotiators

(Graham, 1985b). In simulated negotiations, Brazilians used the word "no" more frequently, the former providing a negative/presumptuous tone vis-a-vis the Japanese and American behaviors. The Brazilian nonverbal behaviors also differ from the Japanese and Americans - no silent periods and far more interruptions, and facial gazing occurs.

Conversational Form: Structural Aspect

"No" - There are substantial differences between the frequency of the use of the word "no" by Brazilian negotiators as opposed to Americans and Japanese (Graham, 1985b). Also, disagreement is a crucial signal in the content analysis schema (Bales, 1950). Japanese negotiators, for example, seldom use the word "no" during negotiations (Nakane, 1970; Ueda, 1974; Van Zandt, 1970). That is, as an explicit negative response, the word "no" is rarely used between Japanese individuals of relatively equal social standing. Van Zandt (1970) explained how Japanese executives will not say "no" to foreign negotiators. Even when the Japanese mean no, they will use a more ambiguous term (Ueda, 1974). Content analysis results (Graham, 1985a) suggested that U.S. negotiators used this word nearly twice as often as their Japanese counterparts.

**Conversational Coordination:
Nonverbal Behaviors and Conversational Overlaps**

Nonverbal behavior refers to what negotiators do rather than what they say. Nonverbal behavior is complex and multifaceted - it delivers multiple messages, many of which are responded to subconsciously (Adler & Graham, 1989). It includes tone of voice, facial expressions and gazing, body distance, touching, gestures, silences, and symbols. Nonverbal behavior varies considerably across cultures (e.g., Graham, 1985b).

According to communication theory, when two individuals are effectively sharing ideas their communication behaviors - both verbal and nonverbal - will be rhythmically coordinated (Gumperz, 1979; Erickson, 1976). Three key variables of conversational coordination are as the following:

Silent Periods - gaps in conversations of ten seconds or more in duration (Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1992). To an American, lengthy periods of silence in a conversation mean something is wrong. In contrast, periods of silence are part of Japanese conversational style. Graham (1985a) reported almost twice as many silent periods in Japanese interaction than American.

Ueda (1974) and Van Zandt (1970) explained how the Japanese can unintentionally gain a negotiating advantage as a result of remaining silent. Graham and Herberger (1983) stated that US executives are uncomfortable with these silent periods and many admitted to their attempts at filling the gap with conversation or yet another persuasive appeal.

Conversational Overlaps - periods when both parties are talking simultaneously, or when the conversational contribution of one speaker overlaps that of the other (Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1992). Conversational overlaps are the opposite of silent periods - they occur when more than one person speaks at the same time. Graham (1985b) discussed the concept of "interactional synchrony" - the unconscious coordination of verbal and nonverbal behaviors of two or more participants in a conversation. One possible measure of this construct is the number of conversational overlaps or interruptions during a conversation. Interruptions are one of the most important structural aspects of conversations (West, 1980).

Facial Gazing - the percentage of time negotiators gaze at the face of their counterparts (Graham, Evenko,

& Rajan, 1992). Several researchers consider the facial gazing in negotiations. For example, Lewis and Fry (1977) found significant relationships between facial gazing and outcomes of negotiations. Also, Argyle and Cook (1976) suggested differences in facial gazing behavior across cultures.

Discrepancies in Conversational Form

Discrepancies in conversational form, although more likely to exist in cross-cultural interactions, may also adversely affect intracultural interactions (Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1992). Poyatos (1988) suggested that such differences in conversational form can cause lack of communication and miscommunication.

Situational Constraint

There are a variety of situational constraints that determine negotiation strategies and outcomes of marketing negotiations: for instance, company goals, location, number of parties, etc. However, through the use of the laboratory methodology (negotiation simulations), the influences of such situational constraints have been controlled (Graham, 1983).

Role of the Negotiator

Status and role also influence the negotiations

(Davis, 1966; Rubin and Brown, 1975). For example, Japanese buyers achieved significantly higher individual profit than did Japanese sellers in negotiation simulations (Graham, 1983, 1984). That is, the role of the negotiator made a significant difference in individual outcomes. There were no differences between American buyers and sellers in the individual results achieved. For Japanese negotiators, the role of the negotiator determined the outcome directly, by putting substantial constraints on the behavior of both sellers and buyers (Graham, 1983). That is, in Japan, sellers deferred to the preferences and needs of buyers. By contrast, American buyers and sellers treated one another more as equals (Graham, 1984).

Another intracultural study by Graham (1988) investigated the dyads of businesspeople across 12 cultures playing the same negotiating game. The results emphasized the importance of recognizing the context of status/role distinction within a culture.

Hall (1976) provided a rationale for the importance of role constraints. He explained a crucial dimension of culture to be the importance of the communication context and specifically noted that the

importance of context can be generalized to negotiating situations. That is, he defined Japan as a high-context country where the words used during negotiations are not as important as the negotiators' status relationships (e.g., who is buyer and who is seller), which are determined prior to the negotiating situations. In other words, deference will be given Japanese buyers because status relationships determine processes and outcomes in that culture.

Also, Tsurami (1971), Jastram (1974) and Oh (1984) explained the importance of status or role distinctions and the effect that they have on negotiations in Japan. In the Japanese business world, buyers are superior in rank and status to sellers. Empirical evidence supports the fact that Japanese buyers do better than sellers (Graham, 1983).

Schmidt (1979) suggested that status is an important factor in negotiations between Taiwanese. Kim (1985) also noted for Korean business relationships: "vertical relationships are more emphasized than horizontal human relations" (p. 4). Thus, there is the influence of status relationships in some Asian cultures such as of Japanese, Taiwanese, and Korean buyers and sellers.

Negotiator Characteristics

One of the key variables of negotiator characteristics is culture (culture of the parties).

Culture as a Negotiator Characteristic

Graham (1980) reported that American businessmen are more interested in short-term outcomes and are more individualistically oriented, whereas Japanese businessmen are more interested in long-term outcomes and problem-solving oriented. Graham (1984) also summarized that honest and informative opponents tend to enhance players' performance in American negotiations, but not necessarily in Japanese negotiations.

Kim (1985) contrasted Korean negotiation styles to those of American and the Japanese. He pointed out the importance of developing personal relationships with Korean business associates. Kim also explained Korean business relationships as vertical. Jang (1985) supported Kim's views and emphasized that Westerners who conduct business with Koreans should take care to build personal relationships.

Schmidt (1979) provided insight into buyer-seller negotiations of the Taiwanese and explained Chinese negotiators as being "generally honest," very price

conscious, and very competitive. He also suggested several differences from Americans in the negotiation process - negotiation took longer and all issues were talked out (both positive and negative aspects). Taiwanese initially asked for a lot, made group decisions topdown, and let age and status affect negotiation outcomes.

Graham, et al. (1988) consistently found different negotiation models for different cultures.

Problem-solving strategies were the key to successful negotiations for the Americans; competitive strategies yielded higher economic rewards for the Chinese; and the role of the negotiator - buyers always do better - determined most buyer-seller negotiation outcomes for the Japanese. The Korean's negotiation style incorporated aspects of the American negotiation model and the Japanese negotiation model. Like the Japanese, the Korean buyers achieved higher profits than Korean sellers in the simulation. This result supports Kim's (1985) views about Koreans' having vertical personal and business relationships.

The results of the study of Graham et al. (1988) suggested that generalizations about negotiation styles of different nationalities, even those in the same

region, are erroneous. For example, similarities were found between the Korean and Japanese negotiation models, but differences also existed. Also, the Chinese approach was quite different from the approaches of the Korean and Japanese as well as the Americans.

Graham's Models of Face-to-Face Marketing
(Buyer-Seller) Negotiations

Models of buyer-seller negotiations proposed by Graham and his colleagues are the models that developed for empirical testing. Specific types of relationships among variables in the model are identified and empirically tested in the following studies of Graham and his colleagues.

Graham, Evenko, and Rajan (1992) proposed a model of business negotiations focusing on the empirical comparison of Soviet and American business negotiations. It is the first study of Soviet negotiation style that conducts the empirical investigation. The emphasis of the model is on the influences of discrepancies in conversational form on negotiation process (negotiation strategy: counterpart's PSA and negotiator's PSA, and

interpersonal attraction) and negotiation outcomes (negotiator's profits and counterpart's satisfaction).

Graham, Evenko, and Rajan (1992) reported that: for the American negotiators: (1) a PSA led to substantially benefits; that is, it increases counterpart's satisfaction and negotiator's profits; (2) attractiveness was positively related to counterpart's satisfaction with the negotiation. For the Soviet businesspeople, the Soviet negotiators achieved higher individual profits when using a competitive or distributive approach in negotiations. This result was in contrast to a more cooperative approach associated with higher profits for the American participants.

From the analysis of the structural aspects and nonverbal behaviors, the study also reported the differences in conversational form: (1) the Soviets used the word "no" less frequently than the Americans; (2) the Soviets interrupted one another with almost three times the frequency of the Americans; (3) there were fewer silent periods in the American negotiations; and (4) facial gazing was similar across the two groups.

Adler, Brahm and Graham (1992) proposed a model of business negotiations focusing on the comparison of the

negotiation behaviors of Chinese (PRC) with those of Americans. This model is the same as Graham, Evenko and Rajan (1992) except that the difference is only one variable - role of negotiator (a situation constraint) instead of cultural variation of parties.

Adler, Graham, and Brahm (1992) reported that both Chinese and American negotiators used a similar problem-solving approach which is helpful for both the PRC Chinese and the American negotiators; that is, it facilitated counterpart's satisfaction. The study also reported the same results (from the analysis of the structural aspects and nonverbal behavior - conversational form) as those of Graham, Evenko and Rajan (1992).

The results of the study supported a picture of PRC Chinese negotiation behavior in which the search for win/win solutions, the exchange of information, and the interpersonal attractiveness of the negotiator lead to better outcomes - that is, they led to higher profits for the negotiator and greater satisfaction for his or her partner. However, there were clear contrasts between the Chinese and the Americans in aspects of conversational forms.

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Thai Culture and Value

From a historical viewpoint, Thai culture and way of life has been mainly nourished and shaped by Buddhism. Unlike other countries in South and Southeast Asia, Thailand never lost its political autonomy. Thus, Thailand has not experienced the stimulation associated with colonial status. Furthermore, when Western ideas are adopted they are consistently phrased in terms of the relevance they have to traditional Thai values and modes of thought (Phillips, 1974, p. 41). As a result, Thailand's traditional culture, basically, has remained surprisingly unchanged (Murray, 1992).

Smuckarn (1979) classified traditional Thai culture into three dominant themes:

1. Personalism. Thais consider that persons are very important. This value influence the behavior of Thais to be self-reliant but to maintain a friendly and genial relationship between themselves and others.
2. Fun-loving. Thais believe that pursuing fun need not be at the expense of earning one's livelihood, with the result that seriousness is eliminated.

3. Merit accumulation. Buddhism has gained wide acceptance because of its emphasis on tolerance and individual initiative, complementing the Thai's cherished inner freedom. Thais believe that Buddhism teaches a way of life which leads to happiness and the elimination of suffering. The fundamental principles of Buddhist discipline are to abstain from evil, to be virtuous and to purify the mind (Kanasingha, 1964, p. 31). Besides this, Thai Buddhists believe in "The Middle Path", trying to avoid violent reactions" (pp. 45-47).

For centuries Buddhism has been the main driving force in Thai cultural development: Thais of all classes and educational levels submitted to its moral authority. That is, they believe that Buddhism is good for morals and sets the rules for daily living. Theravada Buddhism is the religion of more than 80 percent of the Thai people (Polrum, 1988). In general, Thais are much more relationship-oriented than task-oriented. In decision making, consensus is valued very highly; for some Westerns, this means that the pace for reaching a decision is somewhat slow. However, Thais are very meticulous at arriving at a decision that meets the interests of everybody involved (Pacific Rim Trade, 1989). Generally, however, most of the managerial concepts used in Thailand have largely been directly adopted or adapted from Western ideas/countries (Prachachaturakit, 1992).

Thai Negotiation Behavior

Thai cultural patterns are reflected in business transactions. Thai socio-cultural values that may be very important to the negotiations include trust with an emphasis on personal relationships in business, the avoidance of "loss of face," or a breach of trust, and awareness of the importance of hierarchy and seniority (Negotiating in Asia, 1991, p. 59). In general, to be successful in negotiations with Thais is to keep negotiations as friendly and informal as possible (Negotiating in Asia, 1991, p. 59).

Additionally, Hendon and Hendon (1990) suggested general guidelines of nonverbal communication for negotiation with Thais:

1. Facial behavior.

Thais are quite effusive about their smiles as they try to maintain smooth interpersonal relations (p. 86). Thais value keeping smooth and harmonious interpersonal relationships, which they think their smiles facilitate (p. 87).

2. Eye behavior.

Thai culture appreciates consistent eye contact. Thais use eye contact in order to facilitate their daily activities (p. 88).

3. Touch behavior.

Friendly touch behavior is a sign of warmth and acceptance in Thailand - but only among locals and not with foreigners they don't know very well. Touch behavior is acceptable even in business situations for Thais. Thais may not be as demonstrative as the Mexicans, but they will occasionally move closer to and touch each other to emphasize a point (p. 90).

4. Hand and other body movements.

The rule for pointing at people and things with fingers are more complicated in Thailand, where pointing with finger is not as rude as pointing with foot. Thais' tolerance is also greater if pointing at objects (but not sacred objects) rather than people. If it really is necessary to point at somebody because it is difficult to identify him or her verbally, then move chin slightly upward towards the person (p. 92).

In a comparative study of the personality characteristics of the Bahamas, Thailand, and the Philippines, Lefley (1972) found that while Thais expressed honor and pleasure in associating with authority figures, both Filipinos and Bahamians indicated discomfort in the presence of authority. Thais and Filipinos responded with anger to interpersonal aggression while Bahamians expressed suppression and impulse control. Both Filipinos and Thais place greater emphasis on wealth and money as an important value. However, Lefley's (1972) study can

be characterized as descriptive and did not focus on a systematically derived set of personality characteristics as well as used students as subjects.

Cummings, Harnett, and Stevens (1971), on their comparative study of the nationality and personality, reported from eight geographical regions on the four personality variables which is especially important in influencing interpersonal behavior [general tendency toward conciliation or belligerence in interpersonal situations, tendency toward risk-avoidance or risk taking, belief in fate (external control of events) or self-determination (internal control), and tendency toward suspiciousness or trust] that: (1) while Americans exhibited the highest tendency toward risk-taking, Thai executives, as a group, were the most risk-averse; and (2) while the American managers recorded the most extreme belief in internal control, Thai executives reported significantly high in the direction of belief in external determination or fate.

Harnett and Cummings (1980) investigated the effect of cultural buyer-seller differences on the process and results of negotiations in Europe (Belgian, Finland, France, and Spain), United States, Japan and Thailand. They reported that the managers from

Thailand and Japan negotiated in such a manner so as not to give a substantial advantage to the buyer. In these two countries the buyers seemed more willing to let their counterparts set the pattern in the early phases of the negotiations, and were often content to more or less "match" the concessions made by the sellers from these countries. Thus, the impact of the asymmetrical nature of the payoff structure did not appear to be an important factor among the Thais and the Japanese. They also found that the American buyers were able to maintain, even increase, their initial structural advantage whereas the Japanese and Thai negotiators seemed to be striving more for equality in payoff, the result being a fairly even split in final profit between buyers and sellers.

In addition Harnett and Cummings (1980) also reported that the American executives were more competitive than their counterparts from other countries, and although the American executives did not take quite as long to reach agreement as did the Japanese participants, they did take significantly longer than the participants from Thailand and the Europeans. They concluded that for the initial offers as well as final profit, the American (and to a lesser

extent the European) buyers were much more competitively oriented than were the executives from Japan and Thailand.

As previously discussed, although many studies have investigated the effects of personality as well as cultural differences on the process and outcomes of negotiations in many countries, there are few comparative studies of negotiations of Thailand and other countries (e.g., Kirkbride, 1991; Wright, 1991). Also, there are no previous empirical comparative studies of marketing negotiations at a specific management level or within a specific industry of Thailand and the United States.

Summary

This chapter provides a comprehensive review of previous literature that is relevant to the current study. Each of the key variables considered in this study has been the subject of a great deal of research, but no previous research has been done in a comparative study of face-to-face marketing negotiations in the United States and Thailand. Chapter III presents an integrated model of marketing (buyer-seller) negotiations and hypotheses, and methodology.

CHAPTER III

MODEL, HYPOTHESES, AND METHODOLOGY

As stated in Chapter I, the purpose of the current study was to compare and contrast marketing negotiations of American and Thai marketing managers. Chapter II has provided the literature review related to the comparative analysis of this study. This chapter addresses the model and hypotheses, as well as methodology used for obtaining data and information to accomplish the purpose of this study. This chapter consists of six sections:

1. Model, constructs, and hypotheses.
2. Research design.
3. Data collection instruments.
4. Analytical methods.
5. Measurements.
6. Data analysis: statistical analysis

Model, Constructs, and Hypotheses

The proposed model used in this research represented an integration of the variables in the Graham's models (Adler, Brahm, & Graham, 1992; Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1992). This section consists of a discussion of each construct and the variables in the model, a graphic presentation of the model along with specific research hypotheses.

Constructs

There are three classes of constructs: negotiator characteristic, situational constraint (exogenous constructs - independent variables), and the negotiation process (endogenous - mediating or process variables; negotiation strategies and behaviors) that determine negotiation outcomes (dependent variables - profits and satisfaction). Figure 2 presents the model and represents the constructs and relationships investigated in this study.

Negotiation Outcomes

Weitz (1981) suggested that the most appropriate measures of negotiation effectiveness are individual economic outcomes of the sellers and the satisfaction




Figure 2 An Integrated Model of Marketing (Buyer-Seller) Negotiations

(Subscripts: S - seller variables, B - buyer variables)

of their clients. That is, the criteria for selling effectiveness are the individual economic outcomes of the sellers and the satisfaction of their clients (or buyers) over the anticipated duration of the relation (Campbell, et al., 1988). This means that negotiators should strike a balance between maximizing their own profits and the satisfaction of their clients (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Weitz, 1978).

Negotiation Process Constructs

Negotiation process variables include: negotiation strategy - problem-solving approach; and interpersonal attraction. Consistent with several studies reviewed by Rubin and Brown (1975), statistically significant relationships were discovered between a negotiator's problem-solving approach and a counterpart's satisfaction with the negotiation as well as between the counterpart's problem-solving approach and the negotiator's individual profit. Negotiators who encourage counterparts to provide information about themselves and their needs and preferences can be expected to achieve more favorable negotiation outcomes.

Similarly, the influence of the seller's problem-solving approach on the buyer's problem-solving approach has also been investigated. Research suggests the importance of adjusting one's negotiation tactics according to one's impressions of the counterpart's negotiation style. Therefore, high adaptability coupled with cooperativeness will favor enhanced negotiation outcomes. In addition, when negotiators provide information concerning their needs and preferences, their counterparts will be likely to reciprocate.

Walton and McKersie (1965) suggested that the opposite of problem-solving strategies is distributive negotiation strategies. Promises and threats are examples of distributive or instrumental appeals to induce concession-making by the other party. Consequently, negotiators using distributive or instrumental strategies can be expected to achieve enhanced individual negotiation outcomes.

Attractiveness (Interpersonal Attraction)

Research indicates that interpersonal attraction (like/dislike, friendly/unfriendly feelings) can strongly influence and enhance current negotiation outcomes as well as the success of future transactions.

Rubin and Brown (1975) also concluded that interpersonal attraction enhances negotiation outcomes. Thus to the extent that a person receives social rewards from a relationship with someone he/she perceives as attractive, that person will be more satisfied with the negotiation outcome.

Exogenous Constructs

Situational Constraint: Role of the Negotiators

Situational constraint includes the role of the negotiator. The negotiator's role as either buyer or seller has been shown to differentially affect the evaluation of profit achieved in negotiation. In some cultures, the buyers tend to achieve higher economic rewards than their respective sellers. Thus, it is expected that the negotiator's role will influence the profit achieved in negotiation.

Negotiator Characteristics

This study considers one key variable of negotiator characteristics: that is, culture. The fundamental hypothesis of this research is the pervasive influence of culture across the constructs. Thus, cultural influences on the constructs are expected to be different between the American and Thai negotiators.

Hypotheses

The following are statements of each research hypotheses followed by the null hypotheses. Hypotheses are labeled with the appropriate subscripts:

"o" for null hypothesis, and "a" or "b" for American or Thai respectively. For example, H_{0a} refers to the null hypothesis of the American group, and H_{0b} refers to the null hypothesis of the Thai group.

- H_{1a}: For the American marketing managers, seller's individual profit is positively related to buyer's problem-solving approach.
- H_{0a}: For the American marketing managers, seller's individual profit is negatively or not related to buyer's problem-solving approach.
- H_{1b}: For the Thai marketing managers, seller's individual profit is positively related to buyer's problem-solving approach.
- H_{0b}: For the Thai marketing managers, seller's individual profit is negatively or not related to buyer's problem-solving approach.
- H_{2a}: For the American marketing managers, buyer's satisfaction is positively related to seller's problem-solving approach.
- H_{02a}: For the American marketing managers, buyer's satisfaction is negatively or not related to seller's problem-solving approach.

- H2b: For the Thai marketing managers, buyer's satisfaction is positively related to seller's problem-solving approach.
- Ho2b: For the Thai marketing managers, buyer's satisfaction is negatively or not related to seller's problem-solving approach.
- H3a: For the American marketing managers, seller's problem-solving approach is positively related to buyer's problem-solving approach.
- Ho3a: For the American marketing managers, seller's problem-solving approach is negatively or not related to buyer's problem-solving approach.
- H3b: For the Thai marketing managers, seller's problem-solving approach is positively related to buyer's problem-solving approach.
- Ho3b: For the Thai marketing managers, seller's problem-solving approach is negatively or not related to buyer's problem-solving approach.
- H4a: For the American marketing managers, seller's individual profit is inversely related to seller's problem-solving approach.
- Ho4a: For the American marketing managers, seller's individual profit is positively or not related to seller's problem-solving approach.
- H4b: For the Thai marketing managers, seller's individual profit is inversely related to seller's problem-solving approach.
- Ho4b: For the Thai marketing managers, seller's individual profit is positively or not related to seller's problem-solving approach.

- H5a: For the American marketing managers, buyer's satisfaction with the negotiation outcome is positively related to seller's attractiveness.
- Ho5a: For the American marketing managers, buyer's satisfaction with the negotiation outcome is negatively or not related to seller's attractiveness.
- H5b: For the Thai marketing managers, buyer's satisfaction with the negotiation outcome is positively related to seller's attractiveness.
- Ho5b: For the Thai marketing managers, buyer's satisfaction with the negotiation outcome is negatively or not related to seller's attractiveness.
- H6: There are significant differences in seller's problem-solving approach between American and Thai marketing managers.
- Ho6: There are no significant differences in seller's problem-solving approach between American and Thai marketing managers.
- H7: There are significant differences in seller's attractiveness between American and Thai marketing managers.
- Ho7: There are no significant differences in seller's attractiveness between American and Thai marketing managers.
- H8: There are significant differences in buyer's problem-solving approach between American and Thai marketing managers.
- Ho8: There are no significant differences in buyer's problem-solving approach between American and Thai marketing managers.

- H9: There are significant differences in buyer's satisfaction between American and Thai marketing managers.
- Ho9: There are no significant differences in buyer's satisfaction between American and Thai marketing managers.
- H10: There are significant differences in seller's profits between American and Thai marketing managers.
- Ho10: There are no significant differences in seller's profits between American and Thai marketing managers.
- H11: There are significant differences in buyer's profits between American and Thai marketing managers.
- Ho11: There are no significant differences in buyer's profits between American and Thai marketing managers.
- H12: There are significant differences in joint profits between American and Thai marketing managers.
- Ho12: There are no significant differences in joint profits between American and Thai marketing managers.
- H13: There are significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of promise occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.
- Ho13: There are no significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of promise occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

- H14: There are significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of question occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.
- Ho14: There are no significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of question occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.
- H15: There are significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of self-disclosure occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.
- Ho15: There are no significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of self-disclosure occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.
- H16: There are significant differences in conversational form based on the frequency of the word "no" occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.
- Ho16: There are no significant differences in conversational form based on the frequency of the word "no" occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.
- H17: There are significant differences in conversational form based on the frequency of conversational overlap occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.
- Ho17: There are no significant differences in conversational form based on the frequency of conversational overlap occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.
- H18: There are significant differences in conversational form based on the frequency of facial gazing occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.
- Ho18: There are no significant differences in conversational form based on the frequency of facial gazing occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

- H19a: For the American marketing managers, there are significant differences in the individual profit achieved between buyer and seller.
- H019a: For the American marketing managers, there are no significant differences in the individual profit achieved between buyer and seller.
- H19b: For the Thai marketing managers, there are significant differences in the individual profit achieved between buyer and seller.
- H019b: For the Thai marketing managers, there are no significant differences in the individual profit achieved between buyer and seller

Research Design

The purpose of this study was to compare and contrast marketing negotiations of marketing managers in U.S. and Thailand. In doing so, it extended the study of comparative marketing negotiations into a specific industry (audio-video equipment industry) and at the middle-level marketing manager. Accordingly, the research methodology of this study was a replication of the studies of Professor Graham and his colleagues.

The research design of this study was a combination of exploratory and theoretical testing research (field survey research) as well as laboratory experiment (negotiation simulations). Both survey research and experimental methods have their advantages and disadvantages (details of survey and ethnographic approaches are presented in Appendix A). This study attempted to optimize the advantages of the two methods. Instruments and tools included survey research - pre-negotiation questionnaires, self-administered questionnaires; both payoff matrices and post-negotiation questionnaire: experimental method - negotiation simulations.

Simulation Research

The negotiation simulation, developed by Kelley (1966) and used by many researchers (i.e., Clopton, 1987; Graham, 1983, 1984, 1985; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975) provided for the generation of basic data to be analyzed in this study. The simulation involved negotiating for the prices of three products. Each negotiator received an instruction sheet, including a price list with associated profits for each price level. The participants read the instructions (i.e., either a buyer or seller position sheet and appropriate

payoff matrix) and planned their negotiation strategies. The participants were seated across from one another at a table, given final verbal instructions, and the simulation was begun. When an agreement was reached, each participants was asked to complete the post-negotiation questionnaire. Included were measures of satisfaction, negotiation strategies, and attractiveness. The payoff matrices, details of negotiation procedures, negotiation simulation instructions, and post-negotiation questionnaire are presented in Appendix B.

Principal advantages of employing simulation in the research process include:

1. The scenario of events within a simulation and the roles that negotiators were asked to play provided an opportunity to introduce a rich contextual setting for negotiations.

2. A simulation is more conducive to the use of complex issues, free verbal interactions, and cumulative payoffs than the traditional (tightly controlled) experiments or game. It may thus produce findings that can be generalized to the real world with greater validity (Krauss, 1966; Sawyer & Guetzkow, 1965).

In general, however, the number of interacting variables within a simulation often make it difficult for the experimenter to maintain adequate control of the conditions/contexts being manipulated. Similarly, the lack of structure, which allows for verbal interactions that are more free, for example, may also reduce the replicability of findings from session to session. Regardless, the structure of game interactions and the critical elements such as product and profit enhance the replicability of findings from session to session (Pruitt, 1981; Clopton, 1984). In this study, Kelley's (1966) negotiation simulation affords a focused simulation vehicle for investigating the specific phenomena of the impact of different culture or negotiator characteristics on negotiation strategy and process.

In this study, the roles of negotiators were played by the middle-level marketing managers and the stakes of the situation were generally the same for the negotiators as were those that pertained in the audio-video equipments industry. That is, the current study represented the investigations of the real-world comparative marketing negotiations based on an

adequately controlled negotiation simulation as a tool for investigation, analysis, and comparison. It is hoped that this will facilitate bridging the gap that currently exists between the real-world and laboratory studies of comparative marketing negotiations.

The Study Group

The study group was limited to firms engaging in distributing audio and video equipments classified in Industry Group Number 365 and Industry Number 3651. The main reason for selecting this industry as a study group was that this industrial sector is one of the main sectors of the U.S. and Thailand economy but has been ignored by most of the researchers in many academic research areas (Most researchers focused on industries such as automobile, computers, and health care, e.g., Roth & Morrison, 1990).

The study group consisted of marketing managers of U.S. firms that attended the Summer International Consumer Electronic Show (CES), Chicago, June 23-25, 1994, and marketing managers of Thai firms that participated in the Bangkok International Hi-Fi Festival (BIF), Bangkok, April 24-27, 1994. The study group was limited to managers of firms that participated in the exhibition in order to create

homogeneity. In order to avoid biases due to outside control or influence, branches and subsidiaries of these firms as well as retailers were excluded.

Despite a certain degree of homogeneity in the study group used, the results lack external validity. As pointed out by John (1981), the trade-off is that external validity can increase at the expense of internal validity. Since the purpose of this study was to investigate and test the theoretically expected relationships, internal validity was emphasized here as first priority as suggested by Aronson and Smith (1968), Campbell and Stanley (1966), and Cook and Campbell (1979).

The total population was represented by managers from the list of 227 wholesale distributors of the audio-video equipment industry obtained from the American Wholesalers and Distributors Directory (Burek, 1992) and 75 Thai distributors obtained from the Thai Directory of Wholesale Distributors (Ministry of Industry, Thailand, 1992).

Participants

The target participants/subjects in the negotiation simulations were fifty American and fifty Thai middle-level marketing managers (hereafter MLMs)

in the audio and video equipment industry in each country. Since there were differences in the negotiation behavior of students and businesspeople (Fouraker & Siegel, 1963), the subjects were limited to experienced MLMs. All had at least two years of experience in marketing/sales negotiations in their respective countries as well as regularly and directly involved in marketing/sales negotiations.

The decision to use the MLMs as the target respondents fitted Campbell's (1955) criteria that the appropriate respondent/participant must be the key informant in the context of the study. In identifying the key informant, the informant should not be chosen for statistical representativeness, but for special qualities. That is, the key informant must occupy a role that makes him knowledgeable of the issues under study and capable of communicating with or "speaking the language" of the researcher.

Data Collection Instruments

The data collection instruments for this study included:

1. The two phases of pre-negotiation questionnaires which were used for obtaining information concerning the target participants.

2. The payoff matrices (during negotiation simulation sessions) which were previously discussed.
3. The post-negotiation questionnaire.
4. Videotaping.

Sample Size

Within the total population of the universe of concern previously chosen, one key condition was taken into account in identifying the number of the target participants (the sample size): the number of the target participants had to be large enough to provide statistical testing of the theoretically expected relationships.

Funnel Approach Based on the Voluntary Basis: From Population to Potential Participants, and to Target Participants/Subjects

Of the U.S. firms (227 firms), it was expected that at least 75 firms or approximately 150 MLMMs (potential participants) would participate in the Summer International CES 1994, Chicago. Of Thai firms (75 firms), it was also expected that at least 50 firms or approximately 100 MLMMs (potential participants) would participate in BIF 1994, Bangkok.

The first pre-negotiation questionnaires were mailed to all of the U.S. and Thai potential participants 3-4 weeks before the Exhibition began in order to identify the subjects/target participants who were willing to participate in the negotiation simulations. It was expected that 33.33-40% (for U.S.) and 50-60% (for Thai) of the potential participants would be willing to participate in the negotiation simulations (however, all of this expectation depended on the cooperation of the firms and MLMs). That is, at least 25-30 U.S. firms (50-60 American MLMs) and 25-30 Thai firms (50-60 Thai MLMs) were used as the number of the target participants (the sample size) of this study.

The second pre-negotiation questionnaires were mailed 1-2 weeks before the Exhibition began in order to identify the target participants who were willing to participate in the simulations and allow the researcher to videotape. It was also expected that 24 American MLMs and 24 Thai MLMs would be willing to allow the researcher to videotape.

To ensure that the total response rate was high enough (both in percentage and in absolute terms) for

negotiation simulations (statistical testing) and videotape (content analysis), a second wave of both the first- and second- pre-negotiation questionnaires were mailed as well as the telephone calls were used in order to increase the response rate.

The two-phase pre-negotiation questionnaire is presented in Appendix B. A funnel approach based on the voluntary basis for identifying/obtaining the target participants is illustrated in Figure 3. Lists of U.S. and Thai firms that cooperated in this study are presented in Appendix C. The total number of respondents were fifty American and fifty Thai MLMs.

Pretest of Pre-Negotiation Questionnaires

The pre-negotiation questionnaires developed for this study were pretested at two stages. First, the content of the questionnaire, its clarity and relevance, were investigated, and its format was critiqued. After the reviewing process, comments and suggestions were incorporated into a revised questionnaire. The next stage was to determine whether the revised questionnaire was easily understood and whether it was possible to get the cooperation from the potential participants. To achieve this purpose,




Figure 3 A Funnel Approach Based on the Voluntary Basis

interviews were conducted with MIBA (Master of International Business Administration) students (Nova Southeastern University) and the marketing managers of the four major audio-video equipment (retail) distributors (Circuit City, Brandsmart, Sound Advice, and Standard Brands) in the Ft. Lauderdale/Miami area.

Post-Negotiation Questionnaire

After the negotiation session, each participant completed a post-negotiation questionnaire. The post-negotiation questionnaire was comprised of scale items to address major variables under investigation. Included in the post-negotiation questionnaire were measures of satisfaction, attractiveness, and negotiation strategies. To ensure equivalence, the Thai translation of the simulation instructions and questionnaire was back-translated into English by another translator; the two English versions - the original and back translated versions of the questionnaire were compared and translation discrepancies were resolved. Negotiators performed all negotiation sessions in their respective native languages (including simulation instructions).

Videotaping

Of the 50 American and 50 Thai participants in the simulations, 12 American dyads and 12 Thai dyads were videotaped on a voluntary basis.

Analytical Methods

Analytical methods in the current study included: (1) content analysis; and (2) methods for analyzing conversational form and coordination.

Methodology of Content Analysis

Content analysis requires three major decisions which serve as the coding rules: choice of the categories, choice of the unit analysis, and choice of the system enumeration (Angelmar & Stern, 1978; Holsti, 1968). Coding is the process whereby raw data are systematically transformed and aggregated into units which permit precise description of relevant content characteristics (Holsti, 1968). Coding rules are thus an integral part of the research design.

The categories of content analysis are presented in Appendix D. The unit of analysis is the "specific segment of content that is characterized by placing it in a given category" (Holsti, 1968, p. 647). Unitizing may be performed on a syntactic basis, e.g., words,

sentences, or paragraphs; or on a semantic basis, e.g., assertion (Osgood, Saporta, & Nunally, 1956) or intended speech sequence (Bonoma & Rosenberg, 1975; Rosenberg & Bonoma, 1974).

In this study, semantic rather than syntactic units was chosen. This choice was dictated by the fact that Bonoma and Rosenberg (1975) and Rosenberg and Bonoma (1974), upon whose scheme the present one was built, also used semantic units. It reflects a greater concern for validity than for reliability (Markoff, Shapiro, & Weitman, 1975).

Frequency was used as the system of enumeration. It was assumed that each unit was given equal weight with every other unit and, thus, implied nominal scales.

Coding Procedures

Two coders (including the researcher) were employed in classifying segments of the conversation into twelve negotiation categories. All 24 interactions (12 American and 12 Thai interactions) were coded. The researcher coded 16 interactions (8 American and 8 Thai interactions) and a research assistant coded 8 interactions (4 American and 4 Thai interactions) to provide a reliability check.

The coders first read the definitions of the categories. Subsequently, both discussed these categories with reference to some sample material. After a satisfactory degree of coding convergence had been reached, the actual data were treated in two phases. First, each scorer independently divided the material into units of analysis. The resulting units were compared and disagreements recorded and resolved. The second phase of the content analysis consisted of the independent categorization by the coders of the units that had been generated.

Methods for Analyzing Conversational Form and Coordination

The analysis of conversational form and coordination was conducted in accordance with the method employed by Graham et al. (1992). The critical aspects included:

Conversational Form: Structural Aspect

"No". The videotapes were searched for this word, and the numbers of the word "no" were counted and tallied.

Conversational Coordination: Nonverbal Behaviors

Silent Periods. The videotapes were searched for gaps in conversations of ten seconds or more, and these gaps were noted on the transcripts, tallied, and calculated for the duration.

Conversational Overlaps. The videotapes were searched for overlaps, and such interruptions in the flow of conversation were counted. The number of overlaps (interruptions) by each participant was totaled and divided by the time of negotiation to arrive at average incident values which were compared across interactions.

Facial Gazing. The videotapes were reviewed using a stopwatch to record the time each participant spent gazing at the counterpart's face. The proportion of time during which this behavior was engaged in was used in the comparison of interactions.

Measurements

Measurements of Negotiation Outcomes

Profits (both individual and joint profits) such as seller's profit were derived directly from the agreed upon negotiation solution or from the negotiated

agreement. Buyer's satisfaction with the negotiation was measured on 4-item scale included on the buyer's post-negotiation questionnaire.

Measurements of Negotiation Process Constructs

Three process-related measures were also derived from post-negotiation questionnaire and included in the analysis. Participants rated their own negotiation strategies and their counterpart's negotiation strategies on 4-item scale (see Appendix B: post-negotiation questionnaire). The scales for problem-solving approach combined items from both the sellers' and buyers' questionnaires. Finally, buyers rated the interpersonal attraction of their respective sellers. Cooperativeness (problem-solving approach) and interpersonal attraction were measured using 5- and 3-item scales respectively.

Measurements of Exogenous Constructs - Negotiator Characteristic

In this study, culture of the parties was the experimental manipulation. Each participant was asked whether he/she has ever lived/worked or ever been the expatriate in other countries. The purpose was to ensure that the participant had not ever been acculturated from other culture/country.

Measurements of the variables are presented in Appendix E.

Data Analysis: Statistical Analysis

The purpose of data analysis in this study was to empirically test the theoretical expected relationships and differences among variables. The statistical analyses were as the following:

Quality of Measurements and Instruments

The reliability of the measurements used in this study was assessed by using an internal consistency approach (the Cronbach Alpha coefficient) and the validity of the measurements and instruments was reported in Adler, et al. (1992), Campbell, et al. (1988), and Graham, et al. (1992). The basic concepts of reliability and validity, the reliability coefficient: calculation and the interpretation of the Cronbach Alpha coefficient and methods of assessing validity, reliability and validity citations for instruments, the reliability and validity of content analysis, and content scheme reliability and content validity are presented in Appendix F.

Estimates of Reliability

Cronbach's alpha was calculated for each of the scales and items contained in the post-negotiation questionnaire. Nunnally (1967) argued that reliability estimates of 0.50 to 0.60 are sufficient for basic research. The reliability coefficients in Table 2 indicate that each of the measures possesses a moderate to high level of internal consistency. Additionally, the results obtained in this study were consistent with previous research using these measures (i.e., Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1992); Adler, Brahm, & Graham, 1992).

Table 2

Cronbach's Alpha for Survey Instrument Measures

Measure	Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient	
	American	Thai
Seller's Problem-Solving Approach	0.73	0.86
Seller's Attractiveness	0.68	0.64
Buyer's Problem-Solving Approach	0.70	0.76
Buyer's Satisfaction	0.78	0.79

For the assessment of validity of the measures, see Appendix F.

Hypotheses Tests

Hypotheses tests for problem-solving approach (PSA), satisfaction, and attractiveness (ATT) were performed by using the correlation analysis. That is, testing the statistical significance of the relationships between seller's profit and buyer's PSA, buyer's satisfaction and seller's PSA, seller's PSA and buyer's PSA, seller's profit and buyer's profit, as well as buyer's satisfaction and seller's attractiveness (Hypotheses 1 through 5) were conducted by using the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient.

Hypotheses tests for the comparisons of the constructs/variables between the two groups (Hypotheses 6 through 18) were analyzed on the basis of difference in group statistics. Statistical differences concerning seller's PSA and ATT, buyer's PSA and satisfaction, and buyer's, seller's, and joint profits (Hypotheses 6 through 12) were assessed using the Student's T-test. Statistical differences regarding conversational content (promise, question, and self-disclosure), Hypotheses 13 through 15, and conversational form (the word "no",

conversational overlap, and facial gazing), Hypotheses 16 through 18 were compared using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test.

The hypothesis test for the comparison of the effect of the negotiator's role (buyer or seller) on the individual profit between the two groups (Hypothesis 19) was performed by using the Student's T-test.

Summary

This chapter presents the model, constructs, and hypotheses, research design, data collection instruments, analytical methods, measurements of the variables, and data analysis. Chapter IV addresses the analysis and presentation of findings.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

Chapter III provided the model, hypotheses, and research design and methodology. This chapter addresses the analysis and presentation of research findings. The collected data were analyzed and empirically tested to evaluate the hypotheses set forth in Chapter III. This chapter consists of two sections:

1. Testing of hypotheses: research hypotheses, analyses and findings.
2. Summary of hypotheses and findings

Testing of Hypotheses

Testing of Hypotheses 1 through 5

Tables 3 and 4 present descriptive statistics of the variables for Hypotheses 1 through 5 for the American and Thai groups.

Table 3

Descriptive Statistics of the Variables for Hypotheses 1 through 5 - American Group

Variable	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std Dev
\$_S	25	17.00	55.00	40.20	9.89
ATT_S	25	8.00	15.00	11.72	1.62
PSA_S	25	19.00	36.00	29.64	4.75
SAT_B	25	11.00	19.00	15.52	2.14
PSA_B	25	20.00	39.00	28.68	4.62

\$_S = Seller's Profit

ATT_S = Seller's Attractiveness

PSA_S = Seller's Problem-Solving Approach

SAT_B = Buyer's Satisfaction

PSA_B = Buyer's Problem-Solving Approach

Table 4

Descriptive Statistics of the Variables for Hypotheses 1 through 5 - Thai Group

Variable	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std Dev
\$_S	25	3.00	67.00	30.60	16.70
ATT_S	25	9.00	15.00	11.60	2.02
PSA_S	25	18.00	40.00	29.84	5.28
SAT_B	25	9.00	19.00	15.44	2.33
PSA_B	25	18.00	39.00	29.32	4.48

Restating Hypotheses 1 through 5 as tested:

H01a: For the American marketing managers, seller's profit is negatively or not related to buyer's problem-solving approach.

H01b: For the Thai marketing managers, seller's profit is negatively or not related to buyer's problem-solving approach.

H02a: For the American marketing managers, buyer's satisfaction is negatively or not related to seller's problem-solving approach.

H02b: For the Thai marketing managers, buyer's satisfaction is negatively or not related to seller's problem-solving approach.

- Ho3a: For the American marketing managers, seller's problem-solving approach is negatively or not related to buyer's problem-solving approach.
- Ho3b: For the Thai marketing managers, seller's problem-solving approach is negatively or not related to buyer's problem-solving approach.
- Ho4a: For the American marketing managers, seller's profit is positively or not related to seller's problem-solving approach.
- Ho4b: For the Thai marketing managers, seller's profit is positively or not related to seller's problem-solving approach.
- Ho5a: For the American marketing managers, buyer's satisfaction is negatively or not related to seller's attractiveness.
- Ho5b: For the Thai marketing managers, buyer's satisfaction is negatively or not related to seller's attractiveness.

Hypotheses 1 through 5 were tested using Pearson correlation coefficients. Summary of the findings of Hypotheses 1 through 5 is presented in Table 5.

Table 5

Summary of the Findings of Hypotheses 1 through 5
(Pearson Correlation Coefficients)

Hypothesis	Pearson Correlation Coefficients	P-Value
Ho1a	-0.544	0.005*
Ho1b	0.104	0.619
Ho2a	-0.136	0.515
Ho2b	-0.119	0.569
Ho3a	-0.097	0.646
Ho3b	0.073	0.729
Ho4a	0.284	0.168
Ho4b	0.321	0.118
Ho5a	0.199	0.339
Ho5b	-0.182	0.383

 *
 Significant at p-value < 0.01

As presented in Table 5, the findings fail to reject null hypotheses 1 through 5. There is no basis for support of research hypotheses 1 through 5 for either the American or the Thai groups. There is no significant relationship and no indication of

correlation between the two variables for any of the hypotheses tested except for Hypothesis 1 - the American group (HOLA).

For Hypothesis 1 - the American group (HOLA), there is a highly significant inverse relationship between seller's profits and buyer's problem-solving approach since the Pearson correlation coefficient is -0.544 and the p-value (0.005) is less than 0.01. Thus, HOLA was rejected. That is, for the American marketing managers, when buyer uses the problem-solving approach, the seller's profits are decreased.

Testing of Hypotheses 6 through 9

Findings and Analysis of Hypotheses 6 through 9:
Comparisons of the Variables (Seller's Attractiveness and Problem-Solving Approach, Buyer's Satisfaction and Problem-Solving Approach) between the American and Thai Groups
(Student's T-Test)

Table 6 presents descriptive statistics of the variables for Hypotheses 6 through 9.

Table 6

Descriptive Statistics of the variables for Hypotheses 6 through 9

Descriptive Statistics of Seller's Problem-Solving Approach

Culture	N	Mean	Std Dev	Std Error	Minimum	Maximum
American	25	29.64	4.75	0.95	19.00	36.00
Thai	25	29.84	5.28	1.06	18.00	40.00

Descriptive Statistics of Seller's Attractiveness

Culture	N	Mean	Std Dev	Std Error	Minimum	Maximum
American	25	11.72	1.62	0.32	8.00	15.00
Thai	25	11.60	2.02	0.40	9.00	15.00

Descriptive Statistics of Buyer's Problem-Solving Approach

Culture	N	Mean	Std Dev	Std Error	Minimum	Maximum
American	25	28.68	4.62	0.92	20.00	39.00
Thai	25	29.32	4.48	0.89	18.00	39.00

Descriptive Statistics of Buyer's Satisfaction

Culture	N	Mean	Std Dev	Std Error	Minimum	Maximum
American	25	15.52	2.14	0.43	11.00	19.00
Thai	25	15.44	2.33	0.47	9.00	19.00

Restating Hypotheses 6 through 9 as tested:

Ho6: There are no significant differences in seller's problem-solving approach between American and Thai marketing managers.

Ho7: There are no significant differences in seller's attractiveness between American and Thai marketing managers.

Ho8: There are no significant differences in buyer's problem-solving approach between American and Thai marketing managers.

Ho9: There are no significant differences in buyer's satisfaction between American and Thai marketing managers.

Hypotheses 6 through 9 were tested using the Student's T-test. Summary of the findings of Hypotheses 6 through 9 is presented in Table 7.

Table 7

Summary of Findings of Hypotheses 6 through 9 (Student's T-Test)

Hypothesis	P-Value [*]
Ho6	0.8886
Ho7	0.8179
Ho8	0.6211
Ho9	0.9000

*

All p-values are greater than 0.05

Since all p-values are greater than 0.05, as presented in Table 7, the findings fail to reject null hypotheses 6 through 9, and thus there is no basis to support research hypotheses 6 through 9. Therefore, there are no significant differences in seller's problem-solving approach, seller's attractiveness, buyer's problem-solving approach, and buyer's satisfaction between the American and Thai groups.

Testing of Hypotheses 10 through 12

Restating Hypotheses 10 through 12 as tested:

- H₀₁₀: There are no significant differences in seller's profits between American and Thai marketing managers.
- H₀₁₁: There are no significant differences in buyer's profits between American and Thai marketing managers.
- H₀₁₂: There are no significant differences in joint profits between American and Thai marketing managers.

Findings and Analysis of Hypotheses 10 through 12:
Comparisons of the Variables (Seller's, Buyer's, and
Joint Profits) between the American and Thai Groups
(Student's T-Test)

Hypotheses 10 through 12 were tested using
the Student's T-test. Tables 8 through 10 present
descriptive statistics and the findings of
Hypotheses 10 through 12.

Table 8

Comparison of Seller's Profits between the American
and Thai Groups (Descriptive Statistics and Findings)
(Student's T-Test)

Descriptive Statistics of Seller's Profits
(American and Thai)

Culture	N	Mean	Std Dev	Std Error	Minimum	Maximum
American	25	40.20	9.89	1.16	17.00	55.00
Thai	25	30.60	16.70	1.22	3.00	67.00

Findings (Student's T-Test)

Variances	T	DF	Prob > T
Equal	2.4735	48.0	0.0170

For Ho: Variances are equal, $F' = 2.85$ with 24 and 24 DF
Prob > $F' = 0.013$

Since p-value (0.0170) is less than 0.05, as presented in Table 8, the findings indicate rejection of null hypothesis 10, thus providing support for the research hypothesis. Therefore, there are significant differences in seller's profits between the American and Thai marketing managers.

Table 9

Comparison of Buyer's Profits between the American and Thai Groups (Descriptive Statistics and Findings) (Student's T-Test)

Descriptive Statistics of Buyer's Profits
(American and Thai)

Culture	N	Mean	Std Dev	Std Error	Minimum	Maximum
American	25	36.92	10.78	1.34	22.00	63.00
Thai	25	51.32	16.19	1.07	13.00	77.00

Findings (Student's T-Test)

Variances	T	DF	Prob > T
Equal	-3.7018	48.0	0.0006

For Ho: Variances are equal, $F' = 2.25$ with 24 and 24 DF
Prob > $F' = 0.0518$

Since p-value (0.0006) is less than 0.05, as presented in Table 9, the findings indicate rejection of null hypothesis 11, thus providing support for the research hypothesis. Therefore, there are highly significant differences in buyer's profits between the American and Thai marketing managers.

Table 10

Comparison of Joint Profits between the American and Thai Groups (Descriptive Statistics and Findings) (Student's T-Test)

Descriptive Statistics of Joint Profits
(American and Thai)

Culture	N	Mean	Std Dev	Std Error	Minimum	Maximum
American	25	77.12	4.54	0.91	39.00	118.00
Thai	25	81.92	5.47	1.09	16.00	144.00

Findings (Student's T-Test)

Variances	T	DF	Prob > T
Equal	-3.3766	48.0	0.0015

For Ho: Variances are equal, $F' = 1.45$ with 24 and 24 DF
Prob > $F' = 0.3680$

Since p-value (0.0015) is less than 0.05, as presented in Table 10, the findings indicate rejection of null hypothesis 12, thus providing support for the research hypothesis. Therefore, there are highly significant differences in joint profits between the American and Thai marketing managers.

Summary of the findings of Hypotheses 10 through 12 is presented in Table 11.

Table 11

Summary of Findings of Hypotheses 10 through 12
(Student's T-test)

Hypothesis	P-Value
Ho10	0.0170 *
Ho11	0.0006 **
Ho12	0.0015 **

*
Significant at p-value < 0.05

**
Significant at p-value < 0.01

Since all p-values are less than 0.05, as presented in Table 11, the findings indicate rejection of null hypotheses 10 through 12, thus providing support for the research hypotheses. Therefore, there are significant differences in buyer's, seller's, and joint profits between the American and Thai marketing managers.

Testing of Hypotheses 13 through 15

Restating Hypotheses 13 through 15 as tested:

H013: There are no significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of promise occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

H014: There are no significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of question occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

H015: There are no significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of self-disclosure occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

Findings and Analysis of Hypotheses 13 through 15:
Comparisons of Conversational Content (Promise,
Question, and Self-Disclosure) between the
American and Thai Groups (Mann-Whitney U Test)

Hypotheses 13 through 15 were tested using
the Mann-Whitney U test. Tables 12 and 13 present
descriptive statistics and the findings of
Hypotheses 13 and 14.

Table 12

Comparison of Promise between the American and
Thai Groups (Descriptive Statistics and Findings)
(Mann-Whitney U Test)

Descriptive Statistics of Promise
(American and Thai)

Culture	[*] N	Minimum	Maximum	Median
American	12	5.00	16.00	11.00
Thai	12	2.00	8.00	4.00

*
Note: For analyzing Hypotheses 13 through 15,
the unit of analysis is the dyad.

Findings (Mann-Whitney U Test)

Variances	T	DF	Prob > T
Equal	4.2844	22.0	0.0028

For Ho : Variances are equal, $F' = 1.98$ with 11 and 11 DF
Prob > $F' = 0.5333$

Since p-value (0.0028) is less than 0.05, as presented in Table 12, the findings indicate rejection of null hypothesis 13, thus providing support for the research hypothesis. Therefore, there are highly significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of promise occurred between the American and Thai marketing managers.

Table 13

Comparison of Question between the American and Thai Groups (Descriptive Statistics and Findings)
(Mann-Whitney U Test)

Descriptive Statistics of Question
(American and Thai)

Culture	N	Minimum	Maximum	Median
American	12	4.50	24.00	15.50
Thai	12	2.00	21.00	10.00

Findings (Mann-Whitney U Test)

Variances	T	DF	Prob > T
Equal	2.2866	22.0	0.0454

For Ho : Variances are equal, $F' = 1.30$ with 11 and 11 DF Prob > $F' = 0.6683$

Since p-value (0.0454) is less than 0.05, as presented in Table 13, the findings indicate rejection of null hypothesis 14, thus providing support for the research hypothesis. Therefore, there are significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of question occurred between the American and Thai marketing managers.

Summary of the findings of Hypotheses 13 through 15 is presented in Table 14.

Table 14

Summary of the Findings of Hypotheses 13 through 15
(Mann-Whitney U Test)

Hypothesis	P-Value
Ho13	0.0028 **
Ho14	0.0454 *
Ho15	0.6321

**
Significant at p-value < 0.01
*
Significant at p-value < 0.05

Since p-value (0.6321) is greater than 0.05, as presented in Table 14, the findings fail to reject null hypothesis 15, and thus there is no basis to support the research hypothesis. Therefore, there are no significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of self-disclosure occurred between the American and Thai marketing managers.

As indicated in Table 14, the findings indicate rejection of null hypotheses 13 and 14, and fail to reject null hypothesis 15. Therefore, there are significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of promise and question occurred between the American and Thai marketing managers. However, there are no significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of self-disclosure occurred between the American and Thai marketing managers.

Testing of Hypotheses 16 through 18

Restating Hypotheses 16 through 18 as tested:

Hol6: There are no significant differences in conversational form based on the frequency of the word "no" occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

Hol7: There are no significant differences in conversational form based on the frequency of conversational overlap occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

Hol8: There are no significant differences in conversational form based on the frequency of facial gazing occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

Findings and Analysis of Hypotheses 16 through 18:
Comparisons of Conversational Form (the Word "No",
Conversational Overlap, and Facial Gazing)
between the American and Thai Groups
(Mann-Whitney U Test)

Hypotheses 16 through 18 were tested using the Mann-Whitney U test. Tables 15 through 17 present descriptive statistics and the findings of Hypotheses 16 through 18.

Table 15

Comparison of the Word "No" between the American and Thai Groups (Descriptive Statistics and Findings)
(Mann-Whitney U Test)

Descriptive Statistics of the Word "No"
(American and Thai)

Culture	* N	Minimum	Maximum	Median
American	12	3.00	13.00	8.00
Thai	12	1.00	3.00	2.00

*
Note: For analyzing Hypotheses 16 through 18,
the unit of analysis is the dyad.

Findings (Mann-Whitney U Test)

Variances	T	DF	Prob > T
Equal	1.9920	22.0	0.0092

For Ho : Variances are equal, $F' = 7.62$ with 11 and 11 DF
Prob > $F' = 0.2428$

Since p-value (0.0092) is less than 0.05, as presented in Table 15, the findings indicate rejection of null hypothesis 16. The research hypothesis is, therefore, supported. Thus, there are highly significant differences in conversational form based on the frequency of the word "no" occurred between the American and Thai marketing managers.

Table 16

Comparison of Conversational Overlap between the American and Thai Groups (Descriptive Statistics and Findings) (Mann-Whitney U Test)

Descriptive Statistics of Conversational Overlap
(American and Thai)

Culture	[*] N	Minimum	Maximum	Median
American	12	5.50	18.00	12.00
Thai	12	1.00	12.00	5.00

Findings (Mann-Whitney U Test)

Variances	T	DF	Prob > T
Equal	3.1252	22.0	0.0044

For Ho : Variances are equal, $F' = 1.13$ with 11 and 11 DF
Prob > $F' = 0.9571$

Since p-value (0.0044) is less than 0.05, as presented in Table 16, the findings indicate rejection of null hypothesis 17. The research hypothesis is, therefore, supported. Thus, there are highly significant differences in conversational form based on the frequency of conversational overlap occurred between the American and Thai marketing managers.

Table 17

Comparison of Facial Gazing between the American and Thai Groups (Descriptive Statistics and Findings) (Mann-Whitney U Test)

Descriptive Statistics of Facial Gazing
(American and Thai)

Culture	N	Minimum	Maximum	Median
American	12	13.00	24.00	18.00
Thai	12	1.00	12.00	7.00

Findings (Mann-Whitney U Test)

Variances	T	DF	Prob > T
Equal	7.0334	22.0	0.0001

For Ho : Variances are equal, $F' = 1.00$ with 11 and 11 DF Prob > $F' = 1.0000$

Since p-value (0.0001) is less than 0.05, as presented in Table 17, the findings indicate rejection of null hypothesis 18. The research hypothesis is, therefore, supported. Thus, there are highly significant differences in conversational form based on the frequency of facial gazing occurred between the American and Thai marketing managers.

Summary of the findings of Hypotheses 16 through 18 is presented in Table 18.

Table 18

Summary of the Findings of Hypotheses 16 through 18
(Mann-Whitney U Test)

Hypothesis	P-Value
H016	0.0092 **
H017	0.0044 **
H018	0.0001 **

**
Significant at p-value < 0.01

As indicated in Table 18, the findings indicate rejection of null hypotheses 16 through 18. Therefore, there are significant differences in conversational form based on the frequency of the word "no", conversational overlap, and facial gazing occurred between the American and Thai marketing managers.

Findings of Conversational Content and Form
(Percentage)

Findings from the analyses of an exploratory comparison of negotiation behaviors using observational measures of conversational content and form (which analyzed by using percentage) are presented in Tables 19 and 20.

Table 19

Content Analysis Findings (What is said) (Percentage)

Negotiation Behaviors	Culture			
	American (n =12 dyads)		Thai (n = 12 dyads)	
	Total Occurrence for Each Category	Percent*	Total Occurrence for Each Category	Percent*
Promise	54	16	8	5
Threat	2	1	5	3
Recommendation	20	6	1	1
Warning	15	4	0	0
Reward	36	10	2	1
Punishment	2	1	0	0
Positive Normative Appeal	10	3	3	2
Negative Normative Appeal	0	0	1	1
Commitment	0	0	0	0
Self-Disclosure	102	30	95	55
Question	95	28	57	33
Command	0	0	0	0

* +
 Note: Percentage may add up to 100 because of rounding. Total units counted for Americans were 336; for Thais were 172.

Findings and Analysis of Conversation Content
(Percentage): Comparison of Negotiation Behaviors

For both the American and Thai negotiators, as indicated in Table 19, the majority of verbal behaviors were problem-solving/information exchange oriented - questions and self-disclosures. However, Thai marketing managers used a higher percentage of problem-solving behaviors than their American counterparts: 88% (or 33% + 55%) versus 58% (or 28% + 30%), respectively. Another difference becomes apparent when the various instrumental behaviors are added together, that is, threats, promises, commitments, rewards and punishments. Twenty-eight percent of the American marketing managers' statements fell into those categories, compared to only nine percent for Thai marketing managers. Thus the American marketing managers used instrumental negotiation strategies three times more than Thai marketing managers.

Findings and Analysis of Conversational Form
(Percentage): Comparison of Negotiation Behaviors

Silent Period From the data observed, there were no silent periods for the American group. For the Thai group, silent periods observed (from 5 Thai dyads; 7 dyads had no silent periods) were 4 minutes 4 seconds. Therefore the average silent periods = 48.8 seconds or 0.813 minute. Thus the average silent periods per half hour = $0.813/30 = 0.0271$ (or 2.71%) as compared with 0% for the American group.

The analysis of the structural aspects and nonverbal behavior yielded additional differences in conversational form between the American and Thai groups. American marketing managers used the word "no" more frequently than (approximately four times) Thai marketing managers. There were more silent periods in Thai negotiations than the American negotiations as previously discussed. In addition, American marketing managers interrupted one another with two times the frequency of Thai marketing managers. Facial gazing was found to be very different between the two groups. American marketing managers look at the counterpart's face six times longer than Thai marketing managers (see Table 20).

Table 20

Findings Regarding Conversational Form
(How things are said) (Percentage)

	Culture	
	American (n = 12 dyads)	Thai (N = 12 dyads)
Negotiation Behaviors		
<u>Structural Aspect</u>		
The Word "No"	16.89	4.11
<u>Nonverbal Behaviors</u>		
Silent Periods	0.000	0.027
Conversational Overlaps	29.26	13.87
Facial Gazing	11.23	1.87

*
 Note: The Word "No". The average number of times the word "no" was used by each negotiator per 30 minutes of negotiation.

Silent Periods. The average number of conversational gaps initiated by each negotiator, 10 seconds or greater, per half hour.

Conversational Overlaps. The average number of interruptions by each negotiator per half hour.

Facial gazing. The average number of minutes each negotiator looks at counterpart's face, per 10-minute period.

Testing of Hypothesis 19

Restating Hypothesis 19 as tested:

H019a: For the American marketing managers, there are no significant differences in the individual profit achieved between buyer and seller.

H019b: For the Thai marketing managers, there are no significant differences in the individual profit achieved between buyer and seller.

Findings and Analysis of Hypothesis 19:
Comparison of the Effect of the Negotiator's Role
(Buyer or Seller) on the Individual Profit between
the American and Thai Groups
(Student's T-Test)

Hypothesis 19 was tested using the Student's T-test. Descriptive statistics and the findings of Hypothesis 19 for the American group are presented in Table 21 and in Table 22 for the Thai group.

Findings and Analysis of Hypothesis 19
(American Group)

Table 21

Comparison between Seller's Profits and Buyer's Profits of the American Group (Descriptive Statistics and Findings) (Student's T-Test)

Descriptive Statistics of Seller's Profits and Buyer's Profits (American Group)

Profits	N	Mean	Std Dev	Std Error	Minimum	Maximum
Seller's	25	40.20	9.89	1.16	17.00	55.00
Buyer's	25	36.92	10.78	1.34	22.00	63.00

Findings (Student's T-Test)

Variances	T	DF	Prob > T
Equal	1.26	48.0	0.2679

For Ho: Variances are equal, $F' = 2.65$ with 24 and 24 DF
Prob > $F' = 0.255$

Since p-value (0.2679) is greater than 0.05, as presented in Table 21, the findings fail to reject null hypothesis 19 for the American group (Ho19a). Thus, for the American marketing managers, there are no significant differences in the individual profit achieved between buyer and seller.

Findings and Analysis of Hypothesis 19
(Thai Group)

Table 22

Comparison between Seller's Profits and Buyer's Profits
of the Thai Group (Descriptive Statistics and Findings)
(Student's T-Test)

Descriptive Statistics of Seller's Profits and
Buyer's Profits (Thai Group)

Profits	N	Mean	Std Dev	Std Error	Minimum	Maximum
Seller's	25	30.60	16.70	1.22	3.00	67.00
Buyer's	25	51.32	16.19	1.07	13.00	77.00

Findings (Student's T-Test)

Variances	T	DF	Prob > T
Equal	19.85	48.0	0.0001

For Ho: Variances are equal, $F' = 2.05$ with 24 and 24 DF
Prob > $F' = 0.0327$

Since p-value (0.0001) is less than 0.05, as presented in Table 22, the findings indicate rejection of null hypothesis 19 for the Thai group (Ho19b), thus providing support for research hypothesis 18 for the Thai group. Therefore, for the Thai marketing

managers, there are highly significant differences in the individual profit achieved between buyer and seller.

Summary of the findings of Hypothesis 19 is presented in Table 23.

Table 23

Summary of the Findings of Hypothesis 19:
The Influence of Role on Negotiator's Profits
(Student's T-Test)

Hypothesis	Seller's Profits (mean)	Buyer's Profits (mean)	P-value
H018a (American)	40.20	36.92	0.2679
H018b (Thai)	30.60	51.32	0.0001**

**
Significant at p-value < 0.01

As indicated in Table 23, the findings fail to reject null hypothesis 19 for the American group but indicate rejection of null hypothesis 19 for the Thai group. Therefore, for the American marketing managers, there are no significant differences in the individual profit achieved between buyer and seller.

In contrast, for the Thai marketing managers, there are highly significant differences in the individual profit achieved between buyer and seller.

That is, for the American marketing managers, the role of the negotiator had no influence on individual profit. As indicated in Table 23, in negotiations between American marketing managers (see the values of mean), buyers achieve the same level of individual profit as their respective sellers. In contrast, for the Thai marketing managers, the role of the negotiator had influence on individual profit. In negotiations between Thai marketing managers, buyers achieve higher individual profit than sellers.

Summary of Hypotheses and Findings

In this section each hypothesis and finding is summarized as the following:

Hypothesis

Findings

Ho1: Seller's profit is not positively related to buyer's problem-solving approach for the American and Thai marketing managers.

Seller's profit is inversely related to buyer's problem-solving approach for the American group. Seller's profit is not significantly related to buyer's problem-solving approach for the Thai group.

Failed to reject null hypothesis for both groups.

Ho2: Buyer's satisfaction is not positively related to seller's problem-solving approach for the American and Thai marketing managers.

Buyer's satisfaction is not significantly related to seller's problem-solving approach for both groups.

Failed to reject null hypothesis for both groups.

Ho3: Seller's problem-solving approach is not positively related to buyer's problem-solving approach for the American and Thai marketing managers.

Seller's problem-solving approach is not significantly related to buyer's problem-solving approach for both groups.

Failed to reject null hypothesis for both groups.

Ho4: Seller's profit is not inversely related to seller's problem-solving approach for the American and Thai marketing managers.

Seller's profit is not significantly related to seller's problem-solving approach for both groups.

Failed to reject null hypothesis for both groups.

Ho5: Buyer's satisfaction is not positively related to seller's attractiveness for the American Thai marketing managers.

Buyer's satisfaction is not significantly related to seller's attractiveness for both groups.

Failed to reject null hypothesis for both groups.

Ho6: There are no significant differences in seller's problem-solving approach between American and Thai marketing managers.

There are no significant differences in seller's problem-solving approach between American and Thai marketing managers.

Failed to reject null hypothesis.

Ho7: There are no significant differences in seller's attractiveness between American and Thai marketing managers.

There are no significant differences in seller's attractiveness between American and Thai marketing managers.

Failed to reject null hypothesis.

Ho8: There are no significant differences in buyer's problem-solving approach between American and Thai marketing managers.

There are no significant differences in buyer's problem-solving approach between American and Thai marketing managers.

Failed to reject null hypothesis.

Ho9: There are no significant differences in buyer's satisfaction between American and Thai marketing managers.

There are no significant differences in buyer's satisfaction between American and Thai marketing managers.

Failed to reject null hypothesis.

Ho10: There are no significant differences in seller's profits between American and Thai marketing managers.

There are significant differences in seller's profits between American and Thai marketing managers.

The null hypothesis was rejected.

Ho11: There are no significant differences in buyer's profits between American and Thai marketing managers.

There are significant differences in buyer's profits between American and Thai marketing managers.

The null hypothesis was rejected.

Ho12: There are no significant differences in joint profits between American and Thai marketing managers.

There are significant differences in joint profits between American and Thai marketing managers.

The null hypothesis was rejected.

H013: There are no significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of promise occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

There are significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of promise occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

The null hypothesis was rejected.

H014: There are no significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of question occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

There are significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of question occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

The null hypothesis was rejected.

H015: There are no significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of self-disclosure occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

There are no significant differences in conversational content based on the frequency of self-disclosure occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

Failed to reject null hypothesis.

H016: There are no significant differences in conversational form based on the frequency of the word "no" occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

There are significant differences in conversational form based on the frequency of the word "no" occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

The null hypothesis was rejected.

H017: There are no significant differences in conversational form based on the frequency of conversational overlap occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

There are significant differences in conversational form based on the frequency of conversational overlap occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

The null hypothesis was rejected.

H018: There are no significant differences in conversational form based on the frequency of facial gazing occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

There are significant differences in conversational form based on the frequency of facial gazing occurred between American and Thai marketing managers.

The null hypothesis was rejected.

H019: There are no significant differences in the individual profit achieved between buyer and seller for the American and Thai marketing managers.

There are no significant differences in the individual profit achieved between buyer and seller for the American marketing managers.

Failed to reject null hypothesis for the American group.

There are significant differences in the individual profit achieved between buyer and seller for the Thai marketing managers.

The null hypothesis for the Thai group was rejected.

Summary

This chapter provides the analysis and presentation of findings. The key findings are that there are significant differences in: buyer's, seller's, and joint profits; conversational content based on the frequency of promise, and question occurred; and conversational form based on the frequency of conversational overlap, and facial gazing occurred between the American and Thai marketing managers. In addition, for the American marketing managers, there are no significant differences in the individual profit achieved between buyer and seller. For the Thai marketing managers, in contrast, there are significant differences in the individual profit achieved between buyer and seller. Chapter V presents summary of findings and discussions, management implications, limitations and directions for future research, and conclusions.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter consists of the following sections. Initially, a brief statement of the summary of findings and discussions is presented. Management implications are then presented. The limitations impinging on the value of the findings are subsequently reviewed and recommendations on the directions for future research are provided. Finally, conclusions are presented.

Summary of Findings and Discussions

The purpose of this research was to empirically compare and contrast negotiation strategies, processes, and behaviors between American and Thai middle-level marketing/sales managers in the audio-video equipment industry.

Key findings of this study are that there were significant differences between the American and Thai marketing managers on the following constructs:

1. Negotiation outcomes regarding buyer's, seller's, and joint profits.
2. Negotiation processes concerning discrepancies in conversational form which include conversational overlap and facial gazing.
3. Situation constraint regarding the influence of role on individual profit.
4. Negotiation strategy regarding conversational content which includes verbal problem-solving negotiation strategy (i.e., question) and instrumental negotiation strategy (i.e., promise) between the American and Thai marketing managers.

Both American and Thai marketing managers used the problem-solving approach. However, Thai marketing managers, on average, achieved higher individual and joint profits than the American marketing managers.

Discrepancies in conversational form (the word "no", conversational overlap and facial gazing) occurred in Thai marketing negotiations much less than the American marketing negotiations.

For the American marketing managers, buyers achieved the same profit level as did their respective sellers. That is, the role of the negotiator had no influence on individual profit. In contrast, for the

Thai marketing managers, buyers achieved higher individual profit than sellers. That is, the role of the negotiator had the influence on individual profit.

Both American and Thai marketing managers used problem-solving approach. However, the American marketing managers used less verbal problem-solving negotiation strategy and more verbal instrumental negotiation strategy than the Thai marketing managers. The discussions of the key findings are presented as the following.

For the American sellers in this industry, the use of a problem-solving approach yielded different findings from the previous studies. Adler, et al. (1992), Campbell, et al. (1988), Graham, et al. (1992), Pruitt (1981) indicated that when American negotiators (sellers) used problem-solving strategies, his/her negotiation counterparts (buyers) reciprocated. And, when negotiation counterparts (buyers) used a problem-solving approach, the negotiators' (sellers') profits were enhanced.

In the current study seller's problem-solving approach was not significantly related to buyer's satisfaction, buyer's problem-solving approach, and seller's profits. In addition, the data indicated

that, for the American marketing managers in this industry, seller's profits were inversely related to buyer's problem-solving approach. That is, when buyers used the problem-solving approach, the sellers' profits were decreased.

However, this study focuses on the specific industry (audio-video equipment industry) and specific management level (mid-level marketing managers) which is different from the population used in previous studies. Previous studies used the MBA students and general business people not specific to a given management level or industry. In addition, these differences might also be explained by the fact that the audio/video industry is a highly a competitive industry with low margins (International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993; Industry Outlook, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993).

When negotiators (sellers) use the problem-solving strategy, it is the opportunity for the counterparts (buyers) to respond by using competitive or instrumental strategy instead of problem-solving strategy. Therefore, this may lead to the lower benefits (i.e., profits, satisfaction) and vice versa.

All of these factors may affect the unique (or mixed) negotiation style and behavior (both problem-solving and competitive or instrumental style) of the mid-level marketing managers in this industry.

If these differences relate to the unique and specific situation (specific industry and management level), further research is necessary. Additional research/investigation in other industries and specific management levels or other unique settings needs to be undertaken.

The results of the comparison of profits and the analysis of conversational content indicated that the Thai marketing managers used more verbal problem-solving negotiation strategies than the American. They also achieved lower individual (seller's) profit and higher joint profits than the Americans at the same level of buyer satisfaction as the Americans. In addition, the analyses of conversational content and form indicated that the American marketing managers in this industry use more instrumental influence strategies (threats, promises, commitments, rewards and punishments) more than Thai marketing managers. These findings were consistent

with those of Harnett and Cummings (1980) who reported that the American executives were much more competitive than were their Asian counterparts from Japan and Thailand.

From the analysis of the conversational content, Thai marketing managers also placed more emphasis on problem-solving behaviors (questions and self-disclosures) and de-emphasized instrumental influence strategies (threats, promises, commitments, rewards and punishments). In comparative terms, Thai marketing managers used more problem-solving strategies and less instrumental strategies than the American marketing managers.

The analysis of the conversational form also suggests that there were differences between the two groups for every elements of the conversational form considered in the study. For Thai marketing managers, the word "no", conversational overlaps, and facial gazing occurred much less than the Americans, and allowed silent periods. That is, the American negotiators disagreed with counterparts, as measured by the use of the word "no", with strikingly greater frequency than Thai marketing managers. American

negotiators also interrupted each other very frequently, spent more time gazing at counterparts' faces and allowed no silent periods. In summary, the American negotiation process was found to be different from the Thai in every respect of the conversational form.

The differences in the usage of the word "no", silent periods, conversational overlaps, and facial gazing were consistent with previous studies such as Graham (1985b) regarding other cultures (Brazil and Japan). Differences are in not only what the negotiators said during the negotiation simulations, but also how things were said varied substantially across cultures.

The two measures of problem-solving approach, both survey and observational, were found to coincide with one another. Thai marketing managers rated themselves higher on the problem-solving approach scales than did the Americans. The results of the content analysis also suggests that Thai negotiators used more representational (problem-solving) and less instrumental behaviors than did the Americans.

The results also support the influence of role (i.e., buyer/seller) on the negotiation outcomes (individual profits) for the Thai marketing managers in the audio-video equipment industry. For the American marketing managers, the role of negotiator did not influence profits. American buyers achieved the same profit level as did their respective sellers.

On the other hand, the role of negotiator had an impact on profits for the Thai marketing managers. Thai buyers achieved significantly higher individual profits than their respective sellers. This finding suggested role/status relationships determined before the negotiations began had a more important influence on outcomes than did the actual process. This finding was consistent with the traditional, hierarchical society of the Thai in which one would expect the buyer to dominate (see Bank of Thailand, 1993; Hofstede and Bond, 1988; Negotiating in Asia, 1991; Ronen, 1986). The influence of the role is, therefore, important in Thai hierarchical relationship between Thai buyers and sellers. This is in contrast with a more egalitarian relationship between American buyers and sellers.

Further, since no differences were found between American buyers' and sellers' profits, the results of the current study are consistent with Hall's (1976) characterization of the United States as a low context culture (i.e., a verbal message is conveyed explicitly in the speaker's code), and Japanese and Thai as high context cultures (i.e., a verbal message is conveyed in the circumstances).

Management Implications

This study is one of the first empirical studies in the specific settings/context. Until further research is reported, executives should balance the findings with their own experiences when managing and interacting in both intra- and intercultural negotiations.

Perhaps the most important implication of this study results from the confirmation of the mediating role of process-related measures in the determination of marketing negotiation outcomes. Negotiator characteristics (culture of the negotiators) were found to have indirect effects on negotiation outcomes. Thus, it may be implied that it is not enough for managers to select the best representatives or

negotiators possible. Efforts should also be made to train these individuals to manage the process of negotiations more efficiently and effectively.

The success of the problem-solving approach for negotiators (sellers), however, depends upon buyers' responses and behaviors as well as the sellers' behaviors themselves. When counterparts fail to reciprocate with their own problem-solving behaviors, negotiators' economic returns (and other outcomes/benefits) are diminished. The critical questions arising out of this kind of difference are: How is the (American) negotiator to know when these types of problems/obstructions (e.g., delays and recurring problems) require continued perseverance and patience; and when are they symptoms of non-reciprocation?

Perhaps the most important substantive result of this research is the indication that the problem-solving negotiation strategy leads to different outcomes in different cultures. For the American group, problem-solving negotiation strategy leads to lower individual profits. For the Thai group, problem-solving negotiation strategy has no significant relationships with individual profits.

Whereas a cooperative (problem-solving) strategy is important in the success of negotiations, there are some other critical dimensions such as discrepancies in conversational form that are normally perceived as common or ordinary issues in the American culture but not for Thais. The Thai counterparts may not reciprocate to the problem-solving strategy initiated by the American negotiators when such discrepancies exist. This may lead to the diminishing of the interpersonal attraction, benefits (both economics - profits and psychological rewards) and relationships. That is, differences in discrepancies in conversational form which are generally not consciously perceived by negotiators may result in potential problems in cross-cultural negotiations. These imply that high-level executives might consider choosing and training marketing managers who are similar in background and personality to their Thai counterparts and vice versa.

The findings of this study strongly encourage placing emphasis upon the teaching of the adaptation and/or problem-solving strategy in negotiation training programs. Negotiators who view their jobs as one of

creating satisfaction and solving problems for the counterparts are likely to negotiate more profitable marketing agreements and arrangements as well as induce long-term cooperation and relationships.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

The findings and limitations of this study provide several avenues for future research. Since the present study used a relatively small sample size, this may have influenced the findings of this investigation. To rectify these deficiencies, future research needs to maximize the generalizability of the findings by employing a larger sample of middle-level marketing/sales managers from the industry. In addition, in future research, a culturally neutral third-party observer might be used to evaluate the qualities of negotiators strategies during the negotiations to provide a stronger test of the hypotheses.

Face-to-face negotiations are an integral part of the formation and implementation of all business relationships. This study and others regarding international business negotiations suggest fundamental

differences in approaches and behaviors across cultures. Further documentation of such differences in comparative studies such as this one is a crucial step toward understanding and rectifying potential problems.

The problem-solving approach appears to be a pivotal aspect of the negotiation processes in the two cultures. Since the effect of the problem-solving approach may be different in the various countries, these issues need much closer attention. This is particularly true among groups of marketing/sales managers in this industry who are important and/or potential trading partners.

This study should be viewed as only the first step in the comparative study of marketing negotiations in a specific industry and management level. Similar studies using alternative subjects (other level of marketing management or even sales representatives), settings, and methods will be crucial for mitigating the measurement and external validity limitations inherent in this single study.

The value of studies similar to this one might be enhanced in several ways. First, the performance measure - individual profit in a negotiation simulation - should be validated through comparison

with actual negotiation or sales performance. Additionally, negotiation skills are important in marketing and interorganizational interactions, but currently this study has no way of adequately measuring such skills. Correlation analysis between performance in the simulation and performance in the field would aid not only in the research process but also in the training of negotiators. Content analysis techniques such as those employed in this study and by Pennington (1968) or those described by Angelmar and Stern (1978) and Bonoma and Felder (1977) might also be used to analyze both negotiation simulations and real negotiations.

Future research should, of course, consider intercultural negotiations. Complete studies should also consider negotiation simulations combining survey and observational methods as well as both communication content and form. Graham (1985a) and Adler and Graham (1989) reported that negotiators behaviors differ between intra- and intercultural interactions. Further, Moran and Harris (1982) suggested that cross-cultural interactions can be synergistic, that is, cultural differences can be complementary.

Finally, future research needs to be conducted on different issues and influences (i.e., trust, team negotiations, short-term versus long-term relationships, one-shot versus serial or repeated negotiations, the effects of third party, and longitudinal empirically studies), situations/settings (other industry/product such as service industries, distribution channels such as retailers, and countries, as well as other levels of marketing management) where the two cultures as well as other different cultural groups negotiate.

Conclusions

The findings indicated that there were differences and similarities between the two groups on various dimensions. The greatest differences of the two groups were related to how things were said. That is, clear contrasts between the American and Thai marketing managers were found in aspects of conversational form.

The findings of this study imply that the American marketing managers would likely have difficulty negotiating with Thai marketing managers. One of the important areas of future research, therefore, should

be the investigation of American/Thai negotiating interactions. Future research needs to be focused on identifying what if any adjustments/adaptations should be made and by whom.

It is hoped that the findings of this study will broaden the knowledge base and promote the constructive development of research activities into international marketing negotiations. It is also hoped that the findings provide important implications for training marketing executives in this industry in managing intercultural situations more efficiently and effectively in the future.

APPENDIX A

**SURVEY VERSUS ETHNOGRAPHIC APPROACHES TO
STUDYING BUSINESS/MARKETING NEGOTIATIONS**

Survey versus Ethnographic Approaches to
Studying Business/Marketing Negotiations

There are two different perspectives of the method used for the study of business/marketing negotiations among the scholars.

1. Scholars who would use ethnographic methods to study business/marketing negotiations (e.g., Weiss, 1987, 1990).

2. Those who prefer to use techniques of statistical inference applied to data gathered through survey research methods (Tung, 1983, 1984) and laboratory experiments/simulations (Adler, Brahm & Graham, 1992; Adler & Graham, 1989; Campbell, et al., 1988; Graham, 1983, 1984, 1985; Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1992).

In the academic literature, the substance of the comparative study of negotiations is closely linked to social-psychology, game and bargaining as well as the communication theories that have been developed by the authors (e.g., Graham, 1983, 1985; Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1992)), in addition to empirical investigation. The popular literature, on the other hand, has flourished despite the fact that there is often no more than normative assertions regarding the instrumental value of business/marketing negotiations supported by selective anecdotal evidence (e.g., Aonuma, 1981; Hall & Hall, 1987; Moran, 1986; Weiss, 1987, 1990). In addition, no empirical testing of the model appears in most of the literature.

The ethnographic approach (e.g., Weiss, 1987, 1990), a qualitative research technique, typically attempts a complete understanding of a complex international business negotiation phenomena with supporting evidence from the observations and interviews of the parties involved, which is also based on the chronological order of negotiation sessions. This is consistent with Denison (1990, p. 237) who stated: "months or even years of intimate contact and thorough description are prerequisites for good ethnography."

Survey research techniques have been employed in a number of business/marketing negotiations (Adler & Graham, 1990; Campbell, et al., 1988; Graham, 1983, 1984, 1985; Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1992; Tung, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1988). The analytical survey method has several advantages:

1. The delivery of accurate information - within sampling error. That is, most researchers in the area of comparative marketing negotiations (e.g., Campbell, et al., 1988; Graham, 1983, 1985; Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1992) use self-administered payoff matrices during the negotiation simulations and self-administered questionnaires after the negotiation simulations.

2. By using self-administered questionnaires the possibility of interviewer bias error is eliminated (Alreck & Settle, 1985; Kerlinger, 1986).

3. Self-administered questionnaires offer the advantage of greater anonymity; this is particularly important because of the sensitive issues which are explored in culture research.

In addition to the aforementioned advantages, analytical surveys employing the self-administered questionnaire technique offer the significant and distinct advantage of allowing the data to be objectively analyzed to uncover statistically significant relationships. Moreover, Rousseau (1990) asserted that certain dimensions of culture may be appropriately studied using quantitative methods, indeed suggesting that quantitative assessments offer an opportunity to understand the systematic effects of culture on individual behavior. The ethnographic approach, on the other hand, represents a sound qualitative research technique; but remains unsuitable, since the focus of this research was on the empirical or quantitative examination of marketing negotiations.

APPENDIX B

DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

Pre-Negotiation Questionnaire
(First Pre-Negotiation Questionnaire)

Please answer the following questions and statement

1. Are you regularly/directly involved in marketing/sales negotiations for your company?
 1. Yes
 2. No

If Yes, please answer the following questions.
If No, then finish answering this questionnaire.
2. Nationality: _____
 1. American
 2. Thai
 3. Other Nationalities
3. Title of your present position in the company:

4. How many years of experience do you have in marketing/sales negotiations in this industry (Audio/Video Equipment Industry)?
 1. less than 2 years
 2. more than 2 years
5. Have you ever lived/worked in other countries (outside the U.S.A)?
 1. Yes
 2. No
6. If possible, Are you willing to participate in the negotiation simulation?
 1. Yes
 2. No

Thank you for your cooperation.

Code of the Company (for researcher used only) _____

Pre-Negotiation Questionnaire
(Second Pre-Negotiation Questionnaire)

Please answer the following questions and statement

1. Are you regularly/directly involved in marketing/sales negotiations for your company?

1. Yes 2. No

If Yes, please answer the following questions.

If No, then finish answering this questionnaire.

2. Nationality: _____

1. American 2. Thai

3. Other Nationalities

3. Title of your present position in the company:

4. How many years of experience do you have in marketing/sales negotiations in this industry (Audio/Video Equipment Industry)?

1. less than 2 years 2. more than 2 years

5. Have you ever lived/worked in other countries (outside the U.S.A)?

1. Yes 2. No

6. If possible, Are you willing to participate in the negotiation simulation?

1. Yes 2. No

7. If possible, are you willing to allow the researcher to videotape while you are negotiating (in the negotiation simulation)?

1. Yes 2. No

Thank you for your cooperation.

Code of the Company (for researcher used only) _____

Details of Negotiation Procedures
(Graham & Lin, 1987, p. 42)

1. Each participant was allowed 5 minutes to read the written instructions (i.e., either a buyer or seller position sheet and appropriate payoff matrix) and plan negotiation strategies. Questions for clarification were answered during this time.
 2. At the end of the five-minute preparation period, the participants were seated across from one another at a table, given final verbal instructions, and left alone.
 3. The final instructions consisted in part of the following statements: "the negotiation simulation usually takes about fifteen minutes to complete." "there is fifteen-minutes limit." "Once you have reached an agreement, please do not discuss the game further until you have completed the post-negotiation questionnaire."
 4. When an agreement is reached or when fifteen minutes has elapsed the participants are given the post-negotiation questionnaire.
-

Payoff Matrices
(Graham & Lin, 1987, p. 42)

*1 Prices	*2 Buyer Profits			*2 Seller Profits		
	Product			Product		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
A	40	24	16	0	0	0
B	35	21	14	2	3	5
C	30	18	12	4	6	10
D	25	15	10	6	9	15
E	20	12	8	8	12	20
F	15	9	6	10	15	25
G	10	6	4	12	18	30
H	5	3	2	14	21	35
I	0	0	0	16	24	40

*1
If negotiators are to agree on price "E" for all 3 products, then buyers will make a total profit of 40 (20 + 12 + 8), and sellers will make a total profit of 40 (8 + 12 + 20) and joint profit of 40 + 40 = 80.

*2
Profits are adjusted (multiples of those listed above) to reflect realistic levels, given the products involved.

Product 1 = Hi-Fi Stereo Set
Product 2 = VCR
Product 3 = TV

Note 1: In the case of no agreement, each participant is given a score of 24 (IEA, $0 + 8 + 16$, product 3) as profits in the simulation, and a score of 4 on the satisfaction scale (post-negotiation questionnaire).

Note 2: As is evident in the payoff matrices in Appendix B, the simulation allows both competitive and cooperative characteristics. That is, combination of "A" for product 1, "E" for product 2, and "I" for product 3, allows a higher joint profit (i.e., buyer profit + seller profit = $52 + 52 = 104$) than an EEE combination (i.e., 80) and AAA and III maximize individual buyer and seller profit, respectively. Differing amounts and types of background information can be included with the basic payoff matrices, depending on the focus of the research. In the current study, culture of the parties was the only experimental manipulation. Though easy to engage in, the simulation usually provides enough complexity to provide usually fifteen minutes of substantive interaction. Within the fifteen-minute time limit, negotiators used face-to-face, free communication. No explicit rewards (e.g., grades, money) were associated with performance or participation in the simulation.

Negotiation Simulation Instructions
(Graham, 1986, pp. 562-563)

Buyer Position Paper

For the purpose of the exercise, assume that you are the representative of Omega Department Store, a regional chain of department stores. You have been sent to Alpha Appliance Distributors, a wholesaler of the audio and video equipments (A/Vs), to purchase Hi-Fi Stereo sets, VCRs, and color TVs for your stores.

You purchase A/V products from companies like Alpha and then resell them in your department stores. Based on your cost and sale price, it is possible for you to compute potential profits for reselling 100 stereo sets, 100 VCRs, and 100 TVs. For the purposes of the present situation, you are concerned only with buying one model of stereo sets, one model of VCR, and one model of TV.

Naturally, you are attempting to purchase these products as cheaply as possible so that your profits will be high when you resell them. Assume that you could make up to nine different offers on each product and that your profits for each price would be represented in the attached table (payoff matrix). As you can see, on the left there are nine letters. Each letter represents a price at which you could purchase these three A/V products. Price "A" is the cheapest and price "I" is the most expensive. Since the lower your buying price, the greater your profits, your profits will be greatest for price "A" and smallest for price "I". The actual price is not important and can be referred to by letter, but the profits are important and are listed in the table. Thus, if you could buy the stereo sets at price "A" you would make \$4,000, if you could also buy the VCRs at price "A" you would make \$2,400, and if you also bought the TVs for "A" you would make \$1,600, for a total profit of \$8,000, when you resold the items. On the other hand, if you were forced to buy the stereo sets at price "I", the VCRs at price "I", and the TVs at price "I", you would make no profit at all. Assume that variations in prices are possible; that is, you don't have to buy the three A/V products at the same price.

You must come to an agreement on one letter for the stereo sets, one letter for the VCRs, and one letter for the TVs. But you don't have to have the same letter for each of them. You will be making offers for all three items at one time; it is like making a package deal.

The seller has a profit sheet like yours. He or she has the same nine options as you, but with different values attached to them. All that you can be certain of is that he or she will be attempting to sell the three products at as high a price as possible.

Feel free to use part or all of the information provided in this position paper in shaping your negotiation strategies. Create additional arguments to bolster your position if you so desire.

You are free to exchange any information during this negotiation. Although you are not allowed to exchange profit sheets, you can exchange information from the sheets. This information need not be truthful.

Naturally, your company wants to make as much profit as possible.

Seller Position Paper

For the purpose of the exercise, assume that you are the Alpha Appliance Distributors, a wholesaler of the audio and video equipment (A/Vs). You are meet with the representative of Omega Department Store, a regional chain of department stores, who wants to purchase Hi-Fi Stereo sets, VCRs, and color TVs.

It is your job to sell A/V products to companies like Omega. Based on your cost and sale price, it is possible for you to compute potential profits for 100 stereo sets, 100 VCRs, and 100 TVs, the quantities Omega is interested in buying. For the purposes of the present situation, you are concerned only with selling one model of stereo sets, one model of VCR, and one model of TV.

Naturally, you are attempting to sell these products at as high a price as possible so that your profits will be high. Assume that you could make up to nine different offers on each product and that your profits for each price would be represented in the attached table (payoff matrix). As you can see, on the left there are nine letters. Each letter represents a price at which you could sell these three A/V products. Price "A" is the cheapest and price "I" is the most expensive. Since the greater your selling price, the greater your profits, your profits would be greatest for price "I" and smallest for price "A". The actual price is not important and can be referred to by letter, but the profits are important and are listed in the table. Thus, if you could sell the stereo sets at price "I" you would make \$1,600, if you could also sell the VCRs at price "I" you would make \$2,400, and if you also sold the TVs for "I" you would make \$4,000, for a total profit of \$8,000. On the other hand, if you were forced to sell the stereo sets at price "A", the VCRs at price "A", and the TVs at price "A", you would make no profit at all. Assume that variations in prices are possible; that is, you don't have to sell the three A/V products at the same price.

You must come to an agreement on one letter for the stereo sets, one letter for the VCRs, and one letter for the TVs. But you don't have to have the same letter for each of them. You will be making offers for all three items at one time; it is like making a package deal.

The buyer has a profit sheet like yours. He or she has the same nine options as you, but with different values attached to them. All that you can be certain of is that he or she will be attempting to buy the three products at as low a price as possible.

Feel free to use part or all of the information provided in this position paper in shaping your negotiation strategies. Create additional arguments to bolster your position if you so desire.

You are free to exchange any information during this negotiation. Although you are not allowed to exchange profit sheets, you can exchange information from the sheets. This information need not be truthful.

Naturally, your company wants to make as much profit as possible.

Post-Negotiation Questionnaire
(Campbell, et al., 1988, p. 60)

Buyer's Satisfaction

1. If an agreement was reached, how satisfied were you with that agreement?

satisfied 5 4 3 2 1 dis-
satisfied

2. How satisfied are you with the agreement relative to your pregame expectations?

satisfied 5 4 3 2 1 dis-
satisfied

3. How satisfied were you with your individual profit level?

satisfied 5 4 3 2 1 dis-
satisfied

4. How satisfied were you with your performance during the game?

satisfied 5 4 3 2 1 dis-
satisfied

Attractiveness of Seller

1. How comfortable did you feel with the particular person with whom you were paired?

comfort- able	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	uncomfort- able
	5	4	3	2	1	

2. How interested were you in the person with whom you were paired?

interes- ted	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	un- interested
	5	4	3	2	1	

3. How interested would you be in seeing the person with whom you were paired again?

interes- ted	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	un- interested
	5	4	3	2	1	

Representational Negotiation Strategy/Problem-Solving * Approach (PSA)

Self-Report Ratings from Buyer's Questionnaire:

1. Were you more interested in solving your mutual problem, or more self-interested?

solving a mutual problem	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	self- interested
	5	4	3	2	1	

Rate your own negotiation strategies on the following scales:

- | | | | | | | | |
|----|-------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------------------|
| 2. | accomo-
dating | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | exploita-
tive |
| | | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | |
| 3. | honest | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | deceptive |
| | | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | |
| 4. | un-
biased | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | _____ | biased |
| | | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | |

Observed Ratings from Seller's Questionnaire:

5. Do you feel that the person with whom you were paired was more interested in solving your mutual problem, or more self-interested?

solving a mutual problem	5	4	3	2	1	self- interested
--------------------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---------------------

Rate Your Counterpart's Negotiation Strategies on the Following Scales:

6. accomo- dating	5	4	3	2	1	exploita- tive
7. honest	5	4	3	2	1	deceptive
8. un- biased	5	4	3	2	1	biased

* Seller's PSA was measured analogously, with the same eight items but self-report ratings from the seller's questionnaire and observed ratings from the buyer's questionnaire.

* Both buyers and sellers completed identical questionnaires. The data were analyzed considering both buyer and seller responses as one case, a dyadic approach.

DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS
(THAI VERSION)

แบบสอบถามก่อนเจรจาต่อรอง

โปรดเลือกและวงกลมล้อมรอบคำตอบที่เป็นความจริงที่สุดสำหรับตัวท่าน

1. ท่านมีส่วนร่วมหรือเข้าร่วมในการเจรจาต่อรองการตลาด/การขายของบริษัทท่านหรือไม่
 1. มีส่วนร่วม
 2. ไม่มีส่วนร่วม
2. สัญชาติของท่าน
 1. อเมริกัน
 2. ไทย
3. ตำแหน่งของท่านในบริษัทคือ
4. ท่านมีประสบการณ์ด้านการเจรจาต่อรองการตลาด/การขายกี่ปี
 1. น้อยกว่า 2 ปี
 2. มากกว่า 2 ปี
5. ท่านเคยอาศัยอยู่หรือทำงานในต่างประเทศหรือไม่
 1. เคย
 2. ไม่เคย
6. ท่านยินดีที่จะเข้าร่วมในการเจรจาต่อรอง (จำลอง) หรือไม่
 1. ยินดีเข้าร่วม
 2. ไม่ยินดีเข้าร่วม

ขอขอบพระคุณอย่างสูง

(นายสมนึก จันทร์ประทีป)

รหัสของบริษัท
(สำหรับบัญชีเท่านั้น)

แบบสอบถามก่อนเจรจาต่อรอง

โปรดเลือกและวงกลมล้อมรอบคำตอบที่เป็นความจริงที่สุดสำหรับตัวท่าน

1. ท่านมีส่วนร่วมหรือเข้าร่วมในการเจรจาต่อรองการตลาด/การขายของบริษัทท่านหรือไม่
 1. มีส่วนร่วม
 2. ไม่มีส่วนร่วม
2. สัญชาติของท่าน
 1. อเมริกัน
 2. ไทย
3. ตำแหน่งของท่านในบริษัทคือ
4. ท่านมีประสบการณ์ด้านการเจรจาต่อรองการตลาด/การขาย กี่ปี
 1. น้อยกว่า 2 ปี
 2. มากกว่า 2 ปี
5. ท่านเคยอาศัยอยู่หรือทำงานในต่างประเทศหรือไม่
 1. เคย
 2. ไม่เคย
6. ท่านยินดีที่จะเข้าร่วมในการเจรจาต่อรอง (จำลอง) หรือไม่
 1. ยินดีเข้าร่วม
 2. ไม่ยินดีเข้าร่วม
7. ท่านยินดีอนุญาตให้ผู้วิจัยทำการบันทึก วีทีโอ ในขณะที่ท่านกำลังเจรจาต่อรองหรือไม่
 1. ยินดี
 2. ไม่ยินดี

ขอขอบพระคุณอย่างสูง

(นายสมนึก จันทร์ประทีน)

รหัสของบริษัท
(สำหรับผู้วิจัยเท่านั้น)

รายละเอียดของขั้นตอนต่าง ๆ ในการเจรจาต่อรอง

1. ผู้เข้าร่วมเจรจาต่อรองแต่ละท่านมีเวลา 15 นาที
 - 1.1 ในการอ่านคำชี้แจงในการเจรจาต่อรองที่แนบมา (ซึ่งมีทั้งคำชี้แจงในการเจรจาต่อรองสำหรับผู้ซื้อและคำชี้แจงในการเจรจาต่อรองสำหรับผู้ขายและตารางกำไร)
 - 1.2 ในการวางแผนกลยุทธ์การเจรจาต่อรองในช่วงนี้คำถามต่าง ๆ ของผู้เข้าร่วมทุกท่านจะได้รับการตอบและทำความเข้าใจอย่างชัดเจน

2. ในช่วงท้ายของช่วงการเตรียมตัวก่อนการเจรจาต่อรอง (ซึ่งให้เวลาประมาณ 5 นาที) นั้น ผู้เข้าร่วมในการเจรจาต่อรองทั้งสองท่านจะได้รับการขอเชิญให้นั่งตรงกันข้ามกัน (โดยมีโต๊ะคั่นกลาง) เมื่อได้รับคำชี้แจงต่าง ๆ ในการเจรจาต่อรองเป็นครั้งสุดท้ายแล้ว ผู้ดำเนินการก็จะปล่อยให้ผู้เข้าร่วมเจรจาต่อรองทั้งสองท่านอยู่ตามลำพัง

3. คำชี้แจงครั้งสุดท้าย ก่อนการเจรจาต่อรองจะเริ่มประกอบไปด้วย ประโยคต่อไปนี้ "การเจรจาต่อรองนี้ใช้เวลา 15 นาที" "มีเวลาจำกัดเพียง 15 นาทีเท่านั้น" และ "หลังจากที่ท่านบรรลุข้อตกลงแล้ว ขอความกรุณาท่านอย่าได้พูดหรือปรึกษาเกี่ยวกับการเจรจาต่อรองต่อไป จนกว่าท่านจะได้กรอกแบบสอบถามหลังการเจรจาต่อรอง"

4. เมื่อบรรลุข้อตกลงแล้ว หรือเมื่อเวลาได้ผ่านไป 15 นาทีแล้ว ผู้เข้าร่วมการเจรจาต่อรอง ทั้งสองท่านจะได้รับแบบสอบถามหลังการเจรจาต่อรอง

คำชี้แจงเกี่ยวกับการเจรจาต่อรอง

สำหรับผู้อ้อ

สมมุติว่าท่านเป็นตัวแทนจัดซื้อของห้างสรรพสินค้า OMEGA ท่านได้ถูกส่งไปยังบริษัท ALPHA ซึ่งเป็นตัวแทนจัดจำหน่ายเครื่องเสียงและวิดีโอ เพื่อซื้อชุดไฮ-ไฟ สเตริโอ เครื่องเล่นวิดีโอ (VCRs) และทีวีสีให้กับห้างสรรพสินค้าของท่าน

ท่านซื้อเครื่องเสียงและวิดีโอจากบริษัทต่าง ๆ รวมทั้งจากบริษัท ALPHA และขายกลับไปยังห้างสรรพสินค้าในเครือข่ายของบริษัทของท่าน เมื่อพิจารณาจากต้นทุนและราคาขายของท่านแล้ว ท่านสามารถคำนวณกำไรที่เป็นไปได้ สำหรับการนำไปขายต่อของชุดสเตริโอ 100 ชุด VCR 100 เครื่อง และทีวีสี 100 เครื่อง เมื่อพิจารณาสถานการณ์ปัจจุบันแล้ว ท่านสนใจซื้อชุดสเตริโอเพียงรุ่น หรือแบบ (model) เดียว VCR เพียงรุ่นหรือแบบเดียว และทีวีสีเพียงรุ่นหรือแบบเดียว

ท่านพยายามที่จะซื้อผลิตภัณฑ์ดังกล่าว ในราคาที่ถูกลงที่สุดเท่าที่จะเป็นไปได้เพื่อท่านจะได้กำไรสูงสุด เมื่อท่านนำไปขายต่อ สมมุติว่าท่านสามารถเสนอราคาซื้อได้ถึง 9 แบบ สำหรับแต่ละผลิตภัณฑ์ และกำไรที่จะได้รับสำหรับแต่ละผลิตภัณฑ์ 9 แบบ เช่นเดียวกัน (ดังตารางที่แนบมาให้) เมื่อท่านพิจารณาจากตารางที่ให้ไว้ด้านซ้ายมือจะมีอักษร 9 ตัว (จาก A ถึง I) อักษรแต่ละตัวแทนราคาหนึ่งซึ่งท่านสามารถซื้อผลิตภัณฑ์ทั้งสามดังกล่าว ราคา "A" เป็นราคาที่ถูกลงที่สุด และราคา "I" เป็นราคาที่แพงที่สุด เนื่องจากราคาซื้อยิ่งต่ำ กำไรของท่านก็จะยิ่งมากขึ้น ดังนั้นกำไรของท่านจะสูงสุด ณ ราคา "A" และกำไรจะต่ำที่สุด ณ ราคา "I" ราคาที่แท้จริงนั้นไม่สำคัญ ซึ่งสามารถอ้างอิงในจดหมายภายหลังได้ แต่กำไรเป็นสิ่งสำคัญที่สุด (ดังที่ให้ไว้ในตาราง) ดังนั้นถ้าท่านสามารถซื้อชุดสเตริโอที่ราคา "A" ท่านสามารถทำกำไรได้ \$4,000 ถ้าท่านสามารถซื้อ VCR ที่ราคา "A" ท่านสามารถทำกำไรได้ \$2,400 และถ้าท่านสามารถซื้อทีวีสีที่ราคา "A" ท่านสามารถทำกำไรได้ \$1,600 และได้กำไรทั้งหมด \$8,000 เมื่อ

ท่านขายต่อ ในทางตรงกันข้าม ถ้าท่านถูกบังคับให้ซื้อชุดสเตริโอที่ราคา "I" VCR ที่ราคา "I" และทีวีสีที่ราคา "I" ท่านจะไม่ได้รับกำไรเลย ท่านไม่จำเป็นต้องซื้อผลิตภัณฑ์ทั้งสาม ณ ราคาเดียวกันหมด ท่านสามารถซื้อได้ ณ ราคาที่แตกต่างกัน

อนึ่ง ท่านสามารถตกลงในการซื้อผลิตภัณฑ์ทั้งสามในเวลาเดียวกัน โดยไม่จำเป็นต้องแยกซื้อ

ผู้ขายก็มีตารางกำไรเหมือนกับท่าน และมีทางเลือก (ราคา) 9 แบบ เหมือนกับท่าน แต่มีค่า (กำไร) แตกต่างกันในแต่ละทางเลือก (ราคา) สิ่งที่ท่านมั่นใจได้ก็คือ ผู้ขายพยายามที่จะขายผลิตภัณฑ์ทั้งสามให้ได้ในราคาสูงที่สุดเท่าที่จะเป็นไปได้

ท่านสามารถใช้ข้อมูลบางส่วนหรือทั้งหมดที่ให้ไว้ในคำชี้แจงนี้ในการพิจารณาวางแผนกลยุทธ์การเจรจาต่อรองของท่าน ท่านสามารถคิด หรือสร้างข้อโต้แย้งอื่น ๆ เพิ่มเติมได้อิสระ เพื่อเพิ่มกำไรให้แก่ตัวท่านเองได้อย่างอิสระ ท่านสามารถแลกเปลี่ยนข้อมูลอื่น ๆ (การส่งมอบ การโฆษณาร่วม ดันทุน สภาพแวดล้อมต่าง ๆ ฯลฯ) ได้ตามสบาย (ได้อย่างอิสระ) แต่ท่านไม่สามารถที่จะแลกเปลี่ยนตารางกำไร (ใบกำไร) กับผู้ขาย ท่านสามารถแลกเปลี่ยนข้อมูลจากใบทำกำไรได้

สุดท้ายนี้ สิ่งที่สำคัญที่สุดก็คือ บริษัทของท่านต้องการกำไรมากที่สุดเท่าที่จะเป็นไปได้

คำชี้แจงเกี่ยวกับการเจรจาต่อรอง

สำหรับผู้ขาย

สมมติว่าท่านเป็นตัวแทนขายของบริษัท ALPHA ซึ่งเป็นตัวแทนจัดจำหน่ายเครื่องเสียงและวิดีโอ ท่านถูกส่งให้ไปพบกับตัวแทนจัดซื้อของห้างสรรพสินค้า OMEGA ซึ่งต้องการที่จะซื้อชุดไฮ-ไฟสเตริโอ เครื่องเล่นวิดีโอ (VCRs) และทีวีสี งานของท่านก็คือ ขายผลิตภัณฑ์ดังกล่าวให้กับบริษัทต่าง ๆ รวมทั้งบริษัท OMEGA เมื่อพิจารณาจากต้นและราคาขายของท่านแล้ว ท่านสามารถคำนวณกำไรที่เป็นไปได้สำหรับชุดสเตริโอ 100 ชุด VCR 100 เครื่อง และทีวีสี 100 เครื่อง ซึ่งเป็นปริมาณที่ห้างสรรพสินค้า OMEGA สนใจที่จะซื้อ เมื่อพิจารณาสถานการณ์ปัจจุบันแล้ว ท่านสนใจ (หรือมุ่ง) ขายชุดสเตริโอเพียงรุ่นหรือแบบ (model) เดียว VCR เพียงรุ่นหรือแบบเดียว และทีวีสีเพียงรุ่นหรือแบบเดียว

ท่านพยายามที่จะขายผลิตภัณฑ์ดังกล่าวในราคาที่สูงที่สุดเท่าที่จะทำได้ เพื่อจะได้กำไรสูงสุด สมมติว่าท่านเสนอราคาขายได้ถึง 9 แบบ สำหรับแต่ละผลิตภัณฑ์และกำไรที่จะได้รับสำหรับแต่ละผลิตภัณฑ์ 9 แบบ เช่นเดียวกัน (ดังตารางที่แนบมาให้) เมื่อท่านพิจารณาจากตารางที่ให้ไว้ ด้านซ้ายมือจะมีอักษร 9 ตัว (จาก A ถึง I) อักษรแต่ละตัวแทนราคาหนึ่ง ซึ่งท่านสามารถขายผลิตภัณฑ์ทั้งสามดังกล่าว ราคา "A" เป็นราคาที่ถูกที่สุด และราคา "I" เป็นราคาที่แพงที่สุด เนื่องจากราคาขายยิ่งสูงกำไรของท่านก็จะยิ่งมากขึ้น ดังนั้นกำไรของท่านจะสูงสุด ณ ราคา "I" และกำไรจะต่ำที่สุด ณ ราคา "A" ราคาที่แท้จริงนั้นไม่สำคัญ ซึ่งสามารถอ้างอิงในจดหมายภายหลังได้ แต่กำไรเป็นสิ่งสำคัญที่สุด (ดังที่ให้ไว้ในตาราง) ดังนั้นถ้าท่านสามารถขายชุดสเตริโอที่ราคา "I" ท่านสามารถทำกำไรได้ \$1,600 ถ้าท่านสามารถขาย VCR ที่ราคา "I" ท่านสามารถทำกำไรได้ \$2,400 และถ้าท่านสามารถขายทีวีสีที่ราคา "I" ท่านสามารถทำกำไรได้ \$4,000 และได้กำไรทั้งหมด \$8,000 ในทางตรงกันข้าม ถ้าท่านถูกบังคับให้ขายชุดสเตริโอที่ราคา "A" VCR ที่ราคา "A" และทีวีสีที่ราคา "A" ท่านจะไม่ได้รับกำไรเลย ท่านไม่จำเป็นต้องขายผลิตภัณฑ์ทั้งสาม ณ ราคาเดียวกันหมด ท่านสามารถขายได้ ณ ราคาที่แตกต่างกัน

อนึ่งท่านสามารถตกลงในการเสนอขายผลิตภัณฑ์ทั้งสามในเวลาเดียวกัน โดยไม่จำเป็นต้องแยกการเสนอขาย

ผู้ซื้อก็มีตารางกำไรเหมือนกับท่านและมีทางเลือก (ราคา) 9 แบบ เหมือนกับท่าน แต่มีค่า (กำไร) ที่แตกต่างกันในแต่ละทางเลือก (ราคา) สิ่งที่ท่านมั่นใจได้ เลขก็คือ ผู้ซื้อพยายามที่จะซื้อผลิตภัณฑ์ทั้งสามให้ได้ในราคาที่ต่ำที่สุดเท่าที่จะเป็นไปได้

ท่านสามารถใช้ข้อมูลบางส่วนหรือทั้งหมดที่ให้ไว้ในคำชี้แจงนี้ในการพิจารณาวางแผนกลยุทธ์การเจรจาต่อรองของท่าน ท่านสามารถคิด หรือสร้างข้อโต้แย้งอื่น ๆ เพิ่มเติมได้อิสระเพื่อเพิ่มกำไรให้แก่ตัวท่านเองได้อย่างอิสระ ท่านสามารถแลกเปลี่ยนข้อมูลอื่น (การส่งมอบ การโฆษณา ร่วม ต้นทุน สภาพแวดล้อมต่าง ๆ ฯลฯ) ได้ตามสบาย (ได้อย่างอิสระ) แต่ท่านไม่สามารถที่จะแลกเปลี่ยนตารางกำไร (ใบกำไร) กับผู้ซื้อ (ท่านสามารถแลกเปลี่ยนข้อมูลจากใบทำกำไรได้)

สุดท้ายนี้ สิ่งที่สำคัญที่สุดก็คือ บริษัทของท่านต้องการกำไรมากที่สุดเท่าที่จะเป็นไปได้

แบบสอบถามหลังการเจรจาต่อรอง (สำหรับผู้ซื้อ)

ความพอใจของผู้ซื้อ

1. เมื่อบรรลุข้อตกลงแล้ว ท่านมีความพอใจกับการตกลงนั้นอย่างไร?

พอใจ ----- ไม่พอใจ
5 4 3 2 1

2. ท่านมีความพอใจกับข้อตกลงนั้นอย่างไร เมื่อเปรียบเทียบกับผลการคาดหวังของท่านก่อนการเจรจาต่อรอง?

พอใจ ----- ไม่พอใจ
5 4 3 2 1

3. ท่านมีความพอใจอย่างไรกับระดับของกำไรที่ท่านได้รับ?

พอใจ ----- ไม่พอใจ
5 4 3 2 1

4. ท่านมีความพอใจอย่างไรกับการดำเนินการเจรจาต่อรอง (PERFORMANCE) ของตัวท่านเองในระหว่างการเจรจาต่อรอง?

พอใจ ----- ไม่พอใจ
5 4 3 2 1

ความพึงพอใจของผู้ชาย

1. ท่านรู้สึกสบายใจ (COMFORTABLE) อย่างไรกับบุคคลที่ท่านได้เจอจาต่อรองด้วย?

สบายใจ ----- ไม่สบายใจ
5 4 3 2 1

2. ท่านมีความสนใจอย่างไรต่อบุคคลที่ท่านได้เจอจาต่อรองด้วย

สนใจ ----- ไม่สนใจ
5 4 3 2 1

3. ท่านจะมีความรู้สึกสนใจอย่างไรในการพบเห็นกับบุคคลที่ท่านได้เจอจาต่อรอง
ครั้งนี้และได้ถูกจับคู่อีกครั้ง?

สนใจ ----- ไม่สนใจ
5 4 3 2 1

กลยุทธ์การเจรจาต่อรอง

แบบสอบถามสำหรับผู้ซื้อในการให้คะแนนเกี่ยวกับตัวท่านเอง

1. ท่านมีความสนใจในการแก้ไขปัญหาร่วม มากกว่า หรือ ท่านสนใจในเรื่อง
ของท่านมากกว่า?

แก้ไขปัญหาร่วม ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- สนใจในตัวเอง
5 4 3 2 1

โปรดให้คะแนนเกี่ยวกับกลยุทธ์การเจรจาต่อรองของตัวท่านเองบน SCALE
ดังต่อไปนี้

2. สนับสนุนส่งเสริม ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ตัดทวงผล-
5 4 3 2 1 ประโยชน์

3. ซื่อสัตย์ ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- หลอกลวง
5 4 3 2 1

4. ไม่อคติ ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- อคติ
(ตรงไปตรงมา) 5 4 3 2 1 (มีลูกเล่น)

แบบสอบถามสำหรับผู้ชายในการให้คะแนนจากการสังเกต

5. ท่านรู้สึกว่าคุณค่าที่ท่านได้เจรจาต่อรองด้วยนั้นมีความสนใจในการแก้ไขปัญหา
ร่วมของท่าน มากกว่า หรือมีความสนใจต่อตัวเองมากกว่า

แก้ไขปัญหาร่วม ----- สนใจในตัวเอง
5 4 3 2 1

โปรดให้คะแนนกลยุทธ์การเจรจาต่อรองของผู้ที่ท่านได้เจรจาต่อรองด้วยตาม
SCALE ดังต่อไปนี้

6. สนับสนุนส่งเสริม ----- ตัดขวางผล-
5 4 3 2 1 ประโยชน์

7. ซื่อสัตย์ ----- หลอกลวง
5 4 3 2 1

8. ไม่อคติ ----- อคติ
(ตรงไปตรงมา) 5 4 3 2 1 (มีลูกเล่น)

APPENDIX C

**LIST OF THE WHOLESALE DISTRIBUTORS IN
THE AUDIO AND VIDEO EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY
(U.S. AND THAILAND)**

List of U.S. Wholesale Distributors in
the Audio and Video Equipment Industry

*

Allison Acoustics Corp.

Amrita Audio, Inc.

Audioquest Music Corp.

Audio Research, Inc.

Conrad-Johnson Design, Inc.

*

Counterpoint Electronic Systems, Inc.

DGX Audio Corp.

Definitive Technology, Inc.

Encore Electronics, Inc.

Esoteric Audio USA, Inc.

*

Focus Audio, Inc.

*

Fried Products Corp.

General Instrument Corp.

George Kaye Audio Labs, Inc.

*

Linn Hi-Fi Corp.

Lintern Associates, Inc.

Lucasey Corp.

McCormack Audio Corp.

Martin Logan Ltd.

May Audio Marketing, Inc.

*

Melos Audio, Inc.

Merlin Music Systems, Inc.
Musical Surroundings Corp.
Music Hall Corp.
Nordost, Inc.
Omni, Inc. *
P & W International, Inc. (Spectrum Audio) *
Proac, Inc.
Proton Corp.
Spheric Audio Laboratories, Inc.
Stax, Inc.
Straight Wire, Inc.
Sound Connections International, Inc. *
Thiel, Inc.
Thomson Consumer Electronics, Inc.
Valve Amplification Company (VAC), Inc.
Vandersteen Audio, Inc.
Vidikron of America, Inc.
Versalab Corp.
Virtual Audio, Inc.
Zeus Audio Corp.

*
Note: Two marketing/sales managers cooperated in
the negotiation simulations.

List of Thai Wholesale Distributors in
the Audio and Video Equipment Industry

Adex Co., Ltd.
Asava International Co., Ltd.
Asavasopon Co., Ltd.*
Audio Acme Co., Ltd.
Audio Excellence Co., Ltd.*
Audio Institute of Thailand Co., Ltd.
Audiophiles (Thailand) Co., Ltd.
Audio Progress Co., Ltd.
Audio Spectrum Co., Ltd.
Best Center Co., Ltd.
Central Trading Co., Ltd.
Future Land Co., Ltd.
Hi-Fi International Co., Ltd.
Image Audio Co., Ltd.
International Hi-Fi Center Co., Ltd.
K. S. Sons Groups Co., Ltd.
KTL Co., Ltd
Kamol Sukosol Electrics Co., Ltd.*
Kang Yong Watana Co., Ltd.
Laser Definition Co., Ltd.
M R Z Standard Co., Ltd.
Mahajak Development Co., Ltd.
Modify (1992) Co., Ltd.

Old Siam Hi-Fi Co., Ltd.
P H D Premiere Co., Ltd.
Philips Electronics (Thailand) Co., Ltd.
Pioneer Electronics (Thailand) Co., Ltd.
Polar Commerce Co., Ltd.
Proton (Thailand) Co., Ltd.
R.S.T. Trading Group Co., Ltd.
S. M. & M. Marketing Co., Ltd.
S & P Electronics Co., Ltd.*
Siam Music Yamaha Co., Ltd.
Siew-National Co., Ltd.
Sony (Thailand) Co., Ltd.
Sound Chamber Co., Ltd.
Suncolor Co., Ltd.
Superior Audio Co., Ltd.
Tamsen Co., Ltd.
Tawatasin House Co., Ltd.
V.I.P. Audio Compact Co., Ltd.
V.N. Audio., Co., Ltd.
Vanich Distributors Co., Ltd.
View Digitech Co., Ltd.*
View Marketing Co., Ltd.

*
Note: Two marketing/sales managers cooperated in
the negotiation simulations.

APPENDIX D

CONTENT ANALYSIS

Content Analysis

Definition of Content Analysis. Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication (Berelson, 1952, p. 18). Content analysis and coding can be used interchangeably to refer to the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of any symbolic behavior (Cartwright, 1953, p. 424). Barcus (1959) referred content analysis to "the scientific analysis of communications messages ... The method is broadly speaking the scientific method, and it requires that the analysis be rigorous and systematic" (p. 8). Stone (1964) also defined content analysis as any procedure for assessing the relative extent to which specified references, attitudes, or themes permeate a given message or document. This selective definitions indicate that, along with a persisting consensus about some characteristics, there has been a marked tendency to broaden the boundaries of content analysis by means of less restrictive definitions.

Among the characteristics of content analysis on which there is wide agreement are those of objectivity, system, and generality. To have objectivity, the analysis must be carried out on the basis of explicitly formulated rules which will enable two or more persons to obtain the same results from the same documents. In a systematic analysis the inclusion and exclusion of content or categories is done according to consistently applied criteria of selection; this requirement eliminates analyses in which only materials supporting the investigator's hypotheses are examined. By generality, the findings must have theoretical relevance; purely descriptive information about content, unrelated to other attributes of content or to the characteristics of the sender or recipient of the message, is of little scientific value.

The aforementioned three requirements are not unique to content analysis, but are necessary conditions for all scientific inquiry. They serve to indicate that, in general terms, content analysis can be regarded as the application of the principles of scientific research to the analysis of communication content.

In appropriate, a broad of definition of content analysis is any research technique or procedure for making inferences both: (1) about the source of a message, which should be relied upon encoding dependencies, that is, the dependencies of message events upon psychological processes in speakers and writers; and (2) about the effects of a message upon its receivers, which should be relied upon decoding dependencies (that is, the dependencies of events in listeners and readers - their meanings, emotions, attitudes, and the like) and upon the content and structure of messages by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics of messages (Holsti, 1968, p. 601; Osgood, 1959, p. 36).

There are twelve categories of negotiation behaviors or utterances by participants in Angelmar and Stern's (1978) content analysis scheme for the analysis of negotiating communications in marketing settings. This study applied the scheme to transcribed only the conversations since the result of a reliability and validity assessment of the system applied to written communications was positive (Angelmar & Stern, 1978). In this study, transcripts did not include information communicated through other channels, such as proxemics, prosody, kinesics, or facial expression [even though theory indicates that these channels is also important for accurate interpretation and measurement of conversational contributions (Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1992)].

A Category System of Content Analysis for the Study of Negotiation

In this section, the set of categories crucial for the study of negotiation is described. These categories were built around a system proposed by Bonoma and Rosenberg (1975) and Rosenberg and Bonoma (1974). Although the system was designed to apply to social interaction in general, its relevance for negotiation derives from its underlying theoretical orientation which views social interaction as taking place under conditions of conflict. Its core concepts are "the major influence modes through which source attempts to change target's attitudes, attributions or actions" (Bonoma & Rosenberg, 1974, p. 29). These influence modes as well as the empirical literature

reporting their use are discussed extensively in Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma (1973). In addition to these instrumental behaviors, the system also comprises categories for non-influence (representational) communication.

To adapt the system to the negotiation context, certain categories (e.g., reflections or reinterpretations, probes) are deleted and others have to be added (e.g., commitments). The final scheme consists of the following categories (Angelmar & Stern, 1978): promises and threats, warnings and recommendations, rewards and punishments, positive and negative normative appeals, commitments, self-disclosures, questions, and commands.

Promises and Threats. Promises and threats are among the concepts of negotiation theory and research (see, for example, Schelling, 1960). For example, Tedeschi (1970) reviewed more than 80 studies concerned with these concepts. Promises and threats can be related to the tactical assignment of manipulating the costs of the other party's behavior during bargaining (Walton & McKersie, 1965). A promise attempts to decrease the cost of compliant behavior whereas threats increase the cost of noncompliant behavior (cited in Angelmar & Stern, 1978).

Various definitions have been given that differ generally in the extent to which objective factors (an explicit threat or promise) and subjective factors (threat perception, intention of the source, etc.) are taken into account. Because of the problems involved in inferring perceptions and intentions, this study follows Tedeschi's (1970) study in defining promises and threats in an objective way: a promise "constitutes a self-prediction by the source purposefully communicated to target that source will do something at a specifiable future time that target prefers to be done" (p. 160). An example of a promise is: "Accept our bid, Next time we'll accept your counterbid. Then both make a deal." Following Tedeschi (1970), "Threats formally differ from promises in that, though both may call for some target response, the former predicts punishments and the latter predicts rewards" (p. 160). An example of a threat is: "We may have to buy from someone else if you continue to remain stubborn."

Warnings and Recommendations. Recommendations are to warnings as promises are to threats, namely the prediction of pleasant versus aversive consequences. The difference between promises and threats and recommendations and warnings is that, in the latter cases, the source does not control the occurrence of the predicted event, whereas in the former it does (see Tedeschi, 1970; Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1973). The concepts may also be positioned with respect to Raven and Kruglanski's classification of the bases of power (e.g., Raven & Kruglanski, 1970): promises and threats rely on the party's coercive and reward influence, whereas recommendations and warnings rely on its information and expert power.

In terms of Walton and McKersie's (1965) model, recommendations and warnings serve to alter opponent's perception of his own utilities: "Party is enlightening opponent about the consequences opponent will face if the latter should succeed in maintaining his position on a certain issue" (p. 72). At the same time, they may provide information useful for integrative negotiation. An example of a recommendation is: "A target order would help you in keeping the costs low and fill orders after initial purchasing period." An example of a warning is: "Your market may not develop if our influence is not behind you. Your profit picture would look red if you tried it on your own."

Rewards and Punishments. Rewards and punishments consist of the "imposition of reinforcing consequences to a target but without the transmission of any explicit message stipulating the relevant contingencies" (Bonoma & Rosenberg, 1975, p. 34). To Walton and McKersie (1965), rewards and punishments are part of the attitudinal structuring tactics (p. 249). An example of a rewarding message is: "Gentlemen, I am glad to see some progress is being made in our negotiation." An example of a punishment is: "Your offer is completely unreasonable and unworthy of consideration."

Positive and Negative Normative Appeals. All of the foregoing influence modes are interpersonal. However, it seems that "there are influence messages which place their appeal directly in inculcating some feeling of oughtness . . . in the target, and thus

constitute normative rather than purely interpersonal appeals" (Bonoma & Rosenberg, 1975, p. 60). Tedeschi et al. (1973) similarly stated about normative appeals as a separate category: "If one of the negotiators invokes a norm he is in a very real sense substituting situational rules for more direct personal influence" (p. 143). Thus normative appeals are messages in which the party indicates that the other party's behavior has been or will be in accordance with or in violation of social norms. These two concepts are compatible with Raven and Kruglanski's (1970) concept of legitimate influence, normative appeals are part of the tactics of manipulating the opponent's own utilities. An example of a positive normative appeal is: "Think of how much you can help mankind by selling our microscalpels." The following message indicates that the target has been violating the norm of equity: "Try to be more equitable."

Commitments. The concept of a commitment has been treated extensively by Schelling (1960) and by Walton and McKersie (1965). It refers to a self-prediction by a party that its future bidding behavior will not go below or above a certain specific point. For example, in the following statement, a negotiating unit committed itself to a certain maximal level of purchase: "12,000 units is the absolute limit."

In contrast to the preceding categories, this one, as well as the succeeding ones, do not contain polarizations (e.g., rewards and punishments). The polarizations are due to an underlying pleasant-unpleasant dimension, as well as to the fact that there are specific behaviors for each polar end. For commitments and the remaining categories, there are no specific opposite behaviors. Instead, the absence of the behavior provides the counterpart (i.e., commitment versus flexibility).

Self-Disclosures. This category covers statements by a party about itself. During distributive (fixed-sum) negotiation (Walton & McKersie, 1965) such statements serve to disguise the party's negotiation schedule. Parties may attempt to misrepresent their true interest by lying (see Chertkoff, Jerome, & Baird, 1971; Kelley, Beckman, & Fischer, 1967). During integrative (varying-sum) negotiation, self-disclosure

is necessary for problem-solving. An example of a self-disclosure is: "Your last offer of 13,000 units at \$24 will mean \$14,000 loss to us."

Questions. In distributive bargaining, parties ask questions to find out about the other firm's utility function; in integrative negotiation, questions solicit information that contributes to problem-solving. An example of a question is: "Tell me the lowest quantity, at the lowest price you can give us."

Commands. Bonoma and Rosenberg (1975) did not include this category in their scheme but instead coded all commands as threats. They reasoned that all commands carry an implicit message that punishment will be forthcoming if the command is not obeyed. However, this may not always be the case. Instead of an implicit threat, a command may also carry an implicit warning, or even a promise or a recommendation. For example, the message "Give me a lower price!" may imply "or else you will lose"; but the implicit message may also be: "I will make a reciprocal concession." Following Tedeschi's (1970) logic of concentrating on the explicit aspects of messages, this study treats commands as a separate category. Because of the ambiguity of the message implied, commands may have the function of modifying an opponent's perception of his own utilities as well as manipulating costs (Walton & McKersie, 1965).

Because the category scheme presented in this study included both representative (expressive) and instrumental (manipulative) categories and because of its fit with past research on negotiation, the criterion of theoretical relevance appeared to be satisfied.

APPENDIX E

MEASUREMENTS OF THE VARIABLES

Variables of the Study and
Operationalization/Description and
Measurements of the Variables
 (Campbell, et al., 1988, p. 55)

Category	Variable	Symbol
Negotiation Outcomes	Seller's Profit	\$_S
	Buyer's Satisfaction	SAT_B
Situational Constraint	Role of Negotiators	Buyer or Seller
Negotiator Characteristics	Culture	CUL
Process Variables	Representational (or Problem-Solving Approach)/Instrumental Negotiation Strategies	
	Buyer's PSA (Strategies)	PSA_B
	Seller's PSA (Strategies)	PSA_S
	Seller's Attractiveness	ATT_S
	Conversational Form	CONVF
	Conversational Content	-

Operationalization/Description and Measurements

Seller's individual profit level associated with final agreement in Kelley's (1966) negotiation simulation;
Range

Buyer's satisfaction with the outcome of the negotiation simulation; 4 Items, Range, Cronbach's alpha

Role of negotiator in the experiment; either buyer or seller

Culture - American or Thai

Ratings of buyer's negotiation strategies as problem-solving-oriented, a combination of buyer's self-report (4 Items, Cronbach's alpha) and seller's observations (4 Items, Cronbach's alpha); Range, Cronbach's alpha, and Correlation of sums of buyers' 4 items and sums of sellers' 4 items ($p < 0.05$)

Ratings of seller's negotiation strategies as problem-solving-oriented, a combination of seller's self-report (4 Items, Cronbach's alpha) and buyer's observations (4 Items, Cronbach's alpha); Range, Cronbach's alpha, and Correlation of sums of buyers' 4 items and sums of sellers' 4 items ($p < 0.05$)

Attractiveness of sellers as rated by buyers; 3 Items, Range, Cronbach's alpha

Conversational Form: Methods for analyzing conversational form

Conversational Content: Content analysis

APPENDIX F

RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

AND

RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF CONTENT ANALYSIS

Reliability and Validity

Two major criteria for assessing the quality of a measurement instrument include the reliability of the instrument and the validity of the instrument.

Reliability refers to the extent to which a given measurement instrument is free from error.

"Reliability asks one question above all others: with what accuracy does the measure (test, instrument, inventory, questionnaire) measure what it is intended to measure?" (Leedy, 1985, p. 26). Three methods or mechanisms assist in creating or developing the reliable measures are as the following:

1. Using multiple indicators, that is, to ask several questions which measure a single concept. The responses to these separate questions can then be aggregated to create scales. Scales built from multiple indicators increase the reliability of measurement for several reasons. First, few concepts are unidimensional. As a result, it is unlikely that the full content of a concept can be captured by one question. Using multiple indicators enables more aspects of the concept to be assessed and thus reduces error in the measurement of the concept. Second, random measurement error is reduced because measurement error in one indicator is likely to be lessened or cancelled by error in the other indicators. For these reasons, using multiple indicators is likely to improve the reliability of the measures (Shortell, Rousseau, Gillies, Devers, & Simons, 1990).

2. To ask questions using opposite construction, that is, alternating between positively and negatively worded items. Phrasing questions both positively and negatively encourages the respondent to consider the question more carefully. The goal of this variation is to prevent the respondent from getting into a response set (i.e., automatically answering the questions all the same) (Shortell et al., 1990).

3. To use existing measures which have previously been proven to be reliable. Creating new measures is both a difficult and lengthy process since the reliability and validity of these measures must be established (Shortell et al., 1990). If measures of the concept do exist, the effort required is obviously lessened.

The post-negotiation questionnaire has employed all three of these strategies to improve the reliability of its measures. All of the scales representing key concepts of the model are measured by multiple items. All scales contain items that are positively and negatively worded (see Appendix B). And most important, all of the items have been proven to be reliable through previous business/marketing negotiations research.

The Reliability Coefficient: Calculation and Interpretation of the Cronbach Alpha Coefficient

The Cronbach alpha coefficient (Cronbach, 1951) is one of the most commonly used reliability coefficients. This coefficient is a summary measure of the internal homogeneity among a set of items. That is, it is based on the average correlation of items within a test, if the items are standardized to a standard deviation of 1; or on the average covariance among items on a scale, if the items are not standardized. It is logical to assume that the items on a scale are positively correlated with each other because they are measuring, to a certain extent, a common entity.

Since the Cronbach alpha coefficient can be interpreted as a correlation coefficient, it ranges in value from 0 to 1. Negative alpha values occur when items are not positively correlated among themselves and the reliability model is violated. The Cronbach alpha coefficient is computed for each of the scales and indices contained in the survey instrument with the following formula (Norusis, 1990a, p. 467):

$$\alpha = \frac{k \overline{\text{cov}}/\overline{\text{var}}}{1 + (k-1)\overline{\text{cov}}/\overline{\text{var}}}$$

where k is the number of items in the scale, $\overline{\text{cov}}$ is the average covariance between items, and $\overline{\text{var}}$ is the average variance of the items.

Methods of Assessing Validity

Validity refers to the extent to which an instrument actually measures what it is designed to measure (Alreck & Settle, 1985). Several forms of validity are important. Face validity requires that valid measures provide data that relate to the commonly accepted meanings of the concept (Leedy, 1985). "There is no direct statistical method for assessing face validity." (Shortell et al., 1990, p. 15). Once certain concepts and multiple indicators are agreed upon, however, the convergent and discriminant validity of the scales may be assessed (Lehman, 1989). Convergent and discriminant construct validity refers to whether a particular scale correlates (or does not correlate) with other scales in a manner consistent with the theoretical model (Cohen & Cohen, 1975; Leedy, 1985).

Several techniques are useful in assessing validity. Factor analysis is often used as a statistical validation technique because it helps determine whether the operationalization of a key concept is supported by the data (Kerlinger, 1986). Although factor analysis can never "prove" that an instrument is valid, it increases confidence that the multiple indicators used to measure a given concept are indeed measuring a single concept. Factor analysis can also increase confidence in the theoretical model to the extent that one can assert the concepts in the model are distinct (Kerlinger, 1986).

Although factor analysis can increase confidence in the validity of a concept and a theoretical model to some extent, Pearson correlation is usually used to assess convergent and discriminant validity (Shortell et al., 1990). Examining correlations between key scales of a model increases the researcher's confidence that the constructs operate as predicted. Thus Pearson correlations are calculated for the variables contained in the integrated model of marketing negotiations.

Reliability and Validity Citations for
the Instruments

<u>Instruments</u>	<u>Citation</u>
Negotiation Simulation	Cronbach (1951) Kelley (1966) Pruitt and Lewis (1975) Graham (1986) Clopton (1987)
Post-Negotiation Questionnaire	Adler et al. (1992) Campbell et al. (1988) Graham et al. (1992)
Content Analysis	Angelmar and Stern (1978) Holsti (1968)

Content Analysis: Reliability and Validity
(Holsti, 1968, p. 657-663)

Reliability.

If content analysis is to meet the requirement of objectivity, results must be reliable; that is, the research must yield results capable of verification by independent observers. The degree to which a given study will prove reliable is a function of the judges' skill, insight, and experience, and the categories into which content data are to be classified. The content analyst is thus concerned with the reliability of both coders and categories, each of which is important to the overall results of the research (Holsti, 1968).

Individual Reliability. Individual reliability reflects the extent of agreement between any coder and the rest of the judges. Before the actual coding begins, the investigator may want to run experiments to identify and eliminate judges deviating consistently from the group. This can be done by tabulating the correlation or percentage of agreement between every pair of judges. Even assuming that judges possess the skills necessary to make the discriminations required in the coding process, training is usually necessary to enable all coders to rely upon the same aspects of their experience in their decisions (Holsti, 1968). Experimental studies have demonstrated that training prior to coding can significantly increase the level of intercoder agreement (Angelmar & Stern, 1978; Kaplan & Goldsen, 1949; Woodward & Franzen, 1948).

Category Reliability. One goal of a content-analysis research design is to formulate categories "for which the empirical evidence is clear enough so that competent judges will agree to a sufficiently high degree on which items of a certain population belong in the category and which do not" (Schutz, 1958, p. 512). In coding content data or content analysis, the judges must first be able to agree with respect to the boundaries of units coded (or the process of unitizing) (see Holsti, 1968).

In addition to identifying boundaries of the content unit, the judge must decide the category into which the unit is to be placed. Reliability of classification is largely a function of category definition and the types and numbers of discriminations to be made. Pretesting of categories on a sample of the material to be coded will enable the investigator to determine which categories require further clarification. Guetzkow (1950) has derived reliability estimates for both unitizing and categorizing operations which permit the investigator to determine how much of the body of data needs to be cross-checked to ensure any desired level of accuracy.

The investigator faced with low agreement levels at the pretesting stage may attempt to solve the problem by: (1) training coders (as previously discussed); and (2) redefining the categories. A number of approaches which may be used to resolve problems of reliability attributable to categories. First, the analyst may define the categories exhaustively, attempting to reduce coding from a judgmental task to a clerical one. An extensive experiment has demonstrated that flexible coding of symbols yields significantly less reliable results than methods in which every member of a category is specified (Geller, Kaplan, & Lasswell, 1942). However, inasmuch as few categories lend themselves to exhaustive definition, this solution is appropriate only for a limited number of research problems.

Second, fine discriminations between categories often result in a high incidence of disagreement. After pretesting, the investigator may aggregate such categories, but this approach is applicable only if the fine distinctions are not of major theoretical significance.

A third approach to the problem of low reliability is the introduction of additional judges. While this expedient may be necessary for the most difficult judgmental tasks - for example, scaling the intensity of the themes (North et al., 1963) - it adds considerably to research costs and is a poor substitute for precise coding rules.

A solution more generally applicable to decisions of categorization - but not unitizing or scaling for intensity - consists of reducing each judgment to a dichotomous decision; that is, one in which only a single operation is required of the judge (Schutz, 1958). There are several advantages associated with the dichotomous-decision technique. First it permits coders to focus on a single decision at a time, and to review the criteria for choice at each step. It has been demonstrated that, with traditional methods, increasing the number of categories within the category set decreases reliability (Janis, Fadner, & Janowitz, 1943). Thus the dichotomous-decision method should be particularly useful when many categories are necessary. Second, difficulties arise when the process of categorization consists of several judgments, but one decision is logically prior to another because it is relevant to a larger class. The dichotomous-decision method ensures that the choices given to judges are logical. Third, the method permits the analyst to determine precisely where agreement between judges is breaking down, information which is useful in redefining categories.

An acceptable level of reliability is one of many issues for which there is no ready definition. The question can only be answered in the context of a given research problem. That high reliability can be achieved for simple forms of content analysis, in which coding is essentially a mechanical task, is amply documented in the literature. Conversely, as categories and units of analysis become more complex, they are likely to become both more useful and less reliable. In formulating and testing a content-analysis research design, the analyst may thus be forced to strike some appropriate balance between reliability and problem significance (Holsti, 1968). (see content analysis scheme reliability and content validity)

Validity.

Validity is often defined as the extent to which an instrument is measuring what it is intended to measure. The validity of any study is inextricably interrelated with its sampling design and reliability. The meaning of validity may differ from study to study, depending on the investigator's purposes. The American Psychological Association Committee on Psychological Tests has distinguished between content validity, predictive validity, concurrent validity, and construct validity.

Content Validity. Content validity, also sometimes referred to as face validity, has been most frequently relied upon by content analysis. If the purpose of the research is a purely descriptive one, content validity is normally sufficient. Content validity is usually established through the informed judgment of the investigator - that is, "Are the results plausible?"

Predictive Validity. Predictive validity is concerned with the ability of an instrument to predict events for which evidence is not currently available. On the basis of the data, the analyst may predict the occurrence of future events, or of events for which data are at present inaccessible. Extensive use of predictive validity in the content-analysis literature exists in the area of propaganda analysis (see Holsti, 1968).

Concurrent Validity. Concurrent validity is also established by prediction to an outside criterion; it differs from predictive validity only with respect to the time element. If a measure is able to distinguish sources with known differences, the validity of the measure for that purpose is confirmed.

Construct Validity. Construct validity is concerned not only with validating the measure, but also the theory underlying the measure (see Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Janis 1949, and Technical Recommendations, 1954). Corroborating construct validity in content analysis is out of the scope of this study (see Holsti, 1968; McClelland, 1961).

Content Analysis Scheme Reliability and
Content Validity
(Angelmar & Stern, 1978, p. 99)

Type of Test	Type of Analysis Performed	Angelmar & Stern's (1978) Results
Unitizing Reliability	Differences in the number of units between coders as a percentage of sum of units	3.0%
	Agreements concerning unit boundaries as percentage of sum of agreements and disagreements	69.0%
Coding Reliability	Agreements as percentage of total number of codings	66.0%
* Content Validity	Percent units coded in "other category"	2-3%

*
Note: Because the objective of the category scheme is to capture communication during negotiation, one measure of its content validity is the extent to which information is lost by being relegated to the "other" category. As only 2% and 3%, respectively, of the units were assigned to the "other" category by each coder, one can conclude that the system accounts well for the communications emitted during the simulation.

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